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ABSTRACT    
 This thesis comprises three independent but related papers. We identify, in the 
first paper, characteristics of firms reporting Non-Controlling Interests (NCI). We find 
that larger firms, leveraged firms and profitable firms are more likely to use and report 
NCI. Country legal origin also plays an important role and we provide evidence of a 
higher probability of report NCI in French-civil law countries and lower in Common 
law, with Scandinavian/German-civil law countries placed in the middle. In the second 
paper we examine whether the market values NCI differently depending on the 
environment characteristics of each country. We find a positive association between 
NCI and the market value of the parent company shares in France and Greece, and a 
negative association in United Kingdom, Sweden and Germany, although the market 
penalizes less these last two. In the third paper we test the consistency of market in 
pricing NCI similarly irrespectively of being reported on different locations in the 
financial reporting. Our results suggest that investors prices NCI in the same way 
whether reported on the mezzanine section between liabilities and equity or within 
equity.  
 Overall, we provide new evidence about the pattern of use of NCI by European 
countries, supporting that the lower the investor protection environment, the more 
probability of report NCI and the more likelihood of a non-negative association between 
NCI and share prices of parent companies. Notwithstanding, the market is consistent 
and values the NCI similarly, whether or not reported as equity. 
 
Key words: Non-Controlling Interests, Value Relevance, Investor Protection, 
Recognition versus Disclosure.    
JEL Classification: M41-Accounting; G32- Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk 
Management; Capital and Ownership Structure. 
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RESUMO 
 Esta tese compreende três artigos independentes, ainda que relacionados. No 
primeiro, identificamos características das entidades que reportam Non-Controlling 
Interests (NCI). Apuramos  maior probabilidade das empresas de superiores dimensão, 
endividamento e rendibilidade  deterem e reportarem NCI. A  origem do direito é 
igualmente  factor determinante, evidenciando-se  maior probabilidade de  existência  e 
reporte de NCI nos países French-Civil law e menor nos Common law, com os países 
Scandinavian/German-Civil law em posição intermédia. No segundo artigo analisamos 
se o mercado valoriza os NCI de forma diferente em função das características 
institucionais de cada país. Evidenciamos uma associação positiva entre os NCI e o 
valor de mercado das acções da empresa-mãe em França e na Grécia, e negativa no 
Reino Unido, na Suécia e na Alemanha, ainda que nestes últimos dois a penalização do 
mercado seja inferior. No terceiro artigo testamos se os NCI são valorizados de forma 
idêntica, independente da localização do seu reporte nas demonstrações financeiras 
consolidadas. Constatamos que os investidores valorizam similarmente os NCI  quando 
apresentados  entre o passivo e o capital próprio ou  quando  incluídos no capital 
próprio.  
Globalmente, apresentamos evidência inédita sobre o padrão de uso de NCI em 
empresas Europeias, inferindo-se que quanto menor for o nível de protecção ao 
investidor, maior é a probabilidade de se reportar NCI e de se obter uma associação não 
negativa entre os NCI e o preço das acções da empresa-mãe. Não obstante, o mercado é 
consistente e valoriza os NCI de forma similar, apresentados ou não como capital 
próprio. 
 
Palavras-chave: Interesses Sem Controlo, Valor Relevante, Protecção ao Investidor, 
Reconhecimento versus Divulgação. 
JEL Classification: M41-Accounting; G32- Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk 
Management; Capital and Ownership Structure.  
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1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE RESEARCH  
According to prior literature there are two major theories underlying the preparation 
of consolidated financial statements, the parent company theory and the entity theory (e.g. 
Moonitz, 1942; Baxter and Spinney, 1975; Clark, 1993; Scofield, 2003; Zeff, 2005). 
Differences between both theories are mainly related to the recognition and measurement 
of the Non-Controlling Interests reported by some parent companies in their consolidated 
financial statements.  
 The Non-Controlling Interests, hereafter designed as NCI, are defined in current 
International Account Standards (IAS/IFRS) issued by International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), and in Standards of Financial Accounting issued by Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as the equity in a subsidiary not attributable, 
directly or indirectly, to a parent company. This outcomes that NCI are only reported on 
consolidated statement of financial position if the parent have a controlling interest but 
just a portion of equity ownership in a subsidiary. By other words, NCI exists when a 
parent company has subsidiaries that are not wholly owned. 
The theoretical accounting literature for so long have been dedicated concerns with 
the reporting of NCI. Particularly, the major accounting boards (IASB and FASB) have 
been taken some joint projects aiming international standards convergence, and 
accounting for NCI was one of the last items they added to their agenda. In a widespread 
accounting systems all over the world the NCI were a hybrid element that usually was 
reported between equity and liabilities or within liabilities (parent company theory), but 
since 2005 (IASB) and 2008 (FASB) the NCI were required to be presented within equity 
(entity theory). 
Although the vast theoretical literature on theories underlying the accounting for 
NCI or on evolution and development of new standard’ requirements on this issue, just a 
scant stream has been dedicated to empirical research focusing on the NCI reported on 
consolidated financial statements. Even thus, to our knowledge previous empirical 
researches found mixed results and have only investigated single countries.  
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Those previous studies have been conducted with the main objective of identifying 
whether NCI are value relevant to investors within one single country, namely, Spain 
(Abad et al, 2000), Hong Kong (So and Smith, 2009) and United States (Swanson, 2010). 
Abad et al (2000) found some weak evidence supporting the value relevance of NCI, but 
their results show a positive association with the market price of the parent company 
shares. By contrast, So and Smith (2009) and Swanson (2010) found strong evidence of a 
negative association between NCI and shares prices.  
Neither of the above empirical researches has justified the reasons for mixed results, 
which give us an opportunity to extend and contribute to prior literature. It can be 
possible that different market valuations of NCI are associated to differences in the 
institutional characteristics of the countries where firms operate. More precisely, in those 
countries based on common law, traditionally with a stronger level of investor protection, 
the relation between NCI and the parent company share prices probably can be different 
from those countries based on civil law, traditionally with a weaker level of investor 
protection.  
This can be expected because parent shareholders have the right to control the 
subsidiary but NCI have the right to participate and in some cases to monitor the 
subsidiary. Prior literature says that in stronger investor protection environments the 
parent companies are forced to shoulder the costs of control alone, but also forced to 
share the benefits of control with the minority shareholders, being the latter allowed to 
free ride at the controller’s expense. By contrast, in weaker investor protection 
environments, parent shareholders do not face such constrains and have more ability to 
act extracting private benefits from the firm they control at the expense of other non-
controlling shareholders by diverting firm resources for their own use, transferring assets 
of profits out of subsidiaries or committing funds to unprofitable projects that provide 
private benefits. The way as the market views NCI in countries from different legal origin 
as a proxy for investor protection can be a reasonable explanation for prior mixed 
findings on the value relevance of this alternative source of finance.  
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By another hand, we do not have aware of a study that identified the pattern of use 
of NCI. Slight glances at the consolidated financial statements of listed firms in different 
countries give us some expectations to investigate the reasons why in some of them the 
majority of parent companies report NCI meanwhile in other countries a minor number of 
parent companies make use of this source of finance. Thus, it is possible that the decision 
to use NCI could be dependent on firms’ and countries’ characteristics and legal origin 
can be also a reason for differences in the number and proportion of firms reporting NCI 
in different countries. 
Meanwhile, firms applying IAS/IFRS have changed the presentation of NCI, being 
now reported within equity. This change embraces all European countries with different 
legal origins, which gives us the opportunity to identify whether the market prices NCI in 
the same manner independently of the location where they are placed in the consolidated 
statement of financial position. Once again, we do not have aware of any study that 
provided empirical evidence of the market perception on the movement of NCI from 
outside equity to within equity using firms that voluntary have been adopted IAS/IFRS 
before 2005.  
Overall, we identify some gaps on the scan literature on NCI reported on 
consolidated financial statements for which new empirical findings can be interesting for 
different players (e.g., investors, standards setters) in different countries. More precisely, 
we will focus on European countries whose financial statements have been prepared 
under IAS/IFRS. 
  
1.2. OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis have the general aims to identify determinants of the use of Non- 
Controlling Interests (NCI) and to examine the market assessment of NCI reported on 
consolidated statements of financial position (CSFP) by parent companies. To achieve 
these aims we develop a threefold approach. These three approaches are each one build 
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up as an independent research paper, although related, since the results from each one are 
consistent and expanded. The first paper aims to investigate the determinants of using 
NCI as an alternative source of finance equity. The second paper seeks to identify 
whether the market values NCI in a different way depending on the institutional 
environment where firms reporting NCI develop their activities, namely, their legal 
origin. The third paper intends to investigate whether the market prices NCI in the same 
way irrespectively of their location in the consolidated statement of financial position, 
given the new requirements of IAS/IFRS.  
Accordingly, in the first paper we intend to investigate the characteristics of firms 
reporting NCI in order to identify the pattern of use of subsidiaries partially owned by 
European firms. We rely on a sample of 3.463 listed firms from fourteen European 
countries and we contribute to the literature finding that the probability of reporting NCI 
in French-civil-law countries is higher and in Common-law countries is lower, when 
compared to Scandinavian/German-civil-law countries, the benchmark group. We also 
provide empirical evidence that larger firms, leveraged firms and profitable firms are 
more likely to use and report NCI in their consolidated financial statements.   
Given the different likelihood of firms reporting NCI around Europe, we skip to our 
next aim. Accordingly, in the second paper we examine whether the market values NCI in 
a different way depending on the institutional environment of the parent company. We 
select a set of European countries with different levels of investor protection. More 
precisely, our empirical research is developed with data from United Kingdom (Common 
law country), Sweden and Germany (Scandinavian/German-civil-law countries) and 
France and Greece (French-civil-law countries). To achieve our aim, firstly we develop a 
country individual analysis. We find a positive association of NCI with share prices 
occurring in France and in Greece, as opposed to a negative association in United 
Kingdom, as well as in Sweden and in Germany. These results suggest that the market 
values positively the NCI in French-civil law countries but negatively in Common-law 
and Scandinavian/German-civil law countries. Secondly, we put together firms from 
Common-law and from Scandinavian/German-civil law countries in order to find whether 
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the market penalization of NCI is significantly different between these two groups of 
firms. Our final results show that the NCI in Scandinavian/German-civil law countries are 
negatively associated with share prices, although with a less penalization than in the 
Common law country. These findings adds to the literature suggesting that the lower the 
investor protection environment, the more likelihood of a non-negative relation between 
NCI and share prices.  
These previous results are found from a sample period covered from 2008 to 2010, 
thus, all the five countries applied the version of IAS 27
1
, Consolidated and Separate 
Financial Statements, issued by IASB in 2003 and effective from 2005. This version of 
IAS 27 changed the way NCI are reported on financial statements, namely, they started to 
be reported within equity in the consolidated statement of financial position instead of 
being reported on a mezzanine section between equity and liabilities. This gives us the 
opportunity to achieve our latest aim, which turns us to the third paper.  
The aim of our third paper is to investigate whether the market prices NCI by the 
same way irrespectively of their location in the consolidated statement of financial 
position. We analysis whether the current method of reporting NCI (as equity) has a 
differential effect on share prices, relative to the previous method of reporting (as non-
equity), testing the consistency of market investor’s perception on accounting numbers 
presented under different financial statements’ formats. To avoid bias in our results from 
simultaneous changes due to the mandatory of IFRS by 2005, we conduct a within-firm 
design and limit our investigation to IFRS early adopters. Germany is particularly well 
appropriate to our study. Unlike other countries, it has a great representation of early 
adopter firms which provides a reasonable large sample and an ideal natural experiment 
for examining the financial effects of the movement of NCI without suffer the financial 
statement effects of the mandatory adoption of the complete set of IASB standards by 
                                                     
1
 Currently, IASB has issued in May 2011 the IFRS 10, Consolidated Financial Statements, which has 
superseded the requirements relating to consolidated financial statements in IAS 27. However, an entity 
shall apply IFRS 10 (2011) for annual periods beginning just on or after 1 January 2013. Thus, it is not 
effective yet, and, even it was the case, there isn´t changes to NCI or other subjects that could adjust our 
main research and results.  
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2005. With a sample of 308 firm-years observations over the period covering the years 
2002 through 2007 (excluding year-2005 to avoid potential bias of the first time adoption 
of the new version of IAS 27)
 
we provide new empirical evidence suggesting that the 
location of NCI does not matter in terms of market valuation. These final results give 
evidence that investors fully incorporate and process all the information about NCI and 
price them similarly independently of the location where they are reported. These 
findings extend prior literature, suggesting the consistency of investors on pricing NCI, 
since it seems that they are not confused with the change in the reporting format. alter 
In the set of the three papers as a whole, we follow a large number of studies that 
relies on market based empirical research on accounting, which is the search into the 
relationship between publicly disclosed accounting information and the consequences of 
its use by the major group of users (equity investors) as such consequences are reflected 
in characteristics of common stocks traded in major exchanges (Lev and Ohlson, 1982). 
This type of research examines the relation between financial statement information and 
capital markets, and a large fraction of published research in leading academic accounting 
journals referred to its use (Kothari, 2001). Currently, the financial accounting research is 
broadly focused on “(…) the effect of accounting information on the investment decisions 
of external users in capital markets (…)”, as documented in Oler, Oler and Skousen 
(2010: 664). Results from these authors on characterizing accounting research in these 
last five decades suggest that the growing body draws increasingly from both finance and 
economics, and we think our thesis can be framed in this regard. Additionally, each one 
of the papers that are part of this thesis presents a detailed contribution for the state of the 
investigation according to the stream of the literature that is embraced (e.g., Owusu-
Ansah and Yeoh, 2006; Hughes, 2009; Jifri and Citron, 2009; Atanasov, Boone and 
Haushalter, 2010; So and Smith, 2009; Mitra and Hossain, 2009; Swanson, 2010; Lin et 
al, 2011; Landsman et al, 2011).  
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1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Our research methodology uses empirical archival, which is becoming more 
dominant in all top journals around the world (Coyne et al, 2010). Our principal source of 
accounting and market data is the Worldscope
©
 and Datastream
©
 databases from 
Thomson Reuters.  
The first paper uses a research method which is supported in a binary logistic 
regression, a form of regression which is used when the dependent is a dichotomy. It 
helps in the prediction of the probability of occurrence of an event by fitting data to a 
logit function. We develop univariate and multivariate analysis, and we use several 
predictor variables as independent variables, either numerical or categorical. The binary 
logistic is used as a research method firstly to identify firm and country characteristics 
that can be appointed as determinants to the use of NCI as an alternative source of 
finance. The binary logistic estimation accomplishes the subsequent parts of our research 
when necessary to correct for self-selection bias, as suggested by Heckman (1979). 
The second and third papers use a research method which is supported in Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) regressions, and we check that the assumptions underlying their 
usage are satisfied to assure the estimators will be unbiased. This OLS estimation is 
applied to the so-called residual income valuation model expressing firm´s market value 
as the sum of current book value, earnings and other information not directly included in 
financial statements. The model is added with variables whose analysis is of interest 
accordingly with the aim of each paper. More precisely, the NCI variable is included in 
the model used in paper 2 to obtain the market assessment in a cross country comparison 
from different legal origins. As well, the NCI variable is included in the model used in 
paper 3 to provide evidence on the pricing of this element before and after new 
requirements in IAS/IFRS concerning their reporting in consolidated statement of 
financial position. 
These last two papers use a set of firms that have been reported NCI accounting 
numbers in consolidated statement of financial position and that just applied International 
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Financial Reporting Standards (IAS/IFRS) instead of local standards. Thus, it is possible 
that our samples include firms that are a subset of the entire set of firms, forming a non-
randomly selected sample. In order to draw conclusions about the larger population of all 
firms in each country we used, as stated, the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation 
procedure to control for self selection bias. Consistently, in each paper we firstly develop 
the so-called first stage, and we use again a binary logistic model which identifies the 
determinants of choice of use voluntary IAS/IFRS (consistent with the literature) and/or 
use NCI as an alternative source of finance (consistent with our own findings). The 
estimated values in these binary logistic models are then used to generate the Inverse of 
Mill’s ratio for each observation. In the so-called second stage, we use this estimation as 
an additional explanatory variable in our OLS regression valuation model.  
Following the literature, we also include other control variables and our results 
incorporate industry and year fixed effects. When necessary, all our results are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, applying the White and Newey-West 
correction. 
 
1.4. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is organized through three papers. Each one is developed as an 
independent contribution, although they are related. These papers were submitted to 
several peer reviews processes under some scientific associations and academic journals.  
Following this introduction, chapter two contains the first empirical research written 
up as a paper entitled: “Characteristics of firms reporting non-controlling interests: 
empirical evidence from European firms”. This paper was submitted to The International 
Journal of Accounting (ISSN: 0020-7063) in July, 2011. We already received comments 
from the reviewers. 
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Chapter three presents the second empirical research, which rise to the paper 
entitled “On the relation between Non-Controlling Interests and parent companies’ 
market value: a cross-country comparison”. This paper was submitted to the Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy (ISSN: 0278-4254) in August, 2011. Prior versions of this 
paper were presented in several Annual Congresses of European Accounting Association, 
namely the 31st (The Netherlands, 2008), 30th (Lisbon, 2007) and 29th (Ireland, 2006).  
Chapter four includes the third empirical research, which paper is entitled: “Do 
alternative ways of reporting non-controlling interests really matter?”. This paper is 
currently in peer review process on the Financial Accounting and Reporting Section of 
American Accounting Association for their Midyear Meeting Research Session (Chicago, 
2012). It was also presented in a parallel session with discussant, in the 15th Financial 
Reporting and Business Communications Conference, held by University of Bristol 
(Bristol, 2011), as well as in a research forum in the 34th annual Congress of European 
Accounting Association (Rome, 2011). 
Finally, the thesis ends with the conclusions and contributions of each one of the 
papers summarized in chapter 5, and also discusses some limitations and directions for 
future research. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 - CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS REPORTING 
NON-CONTROLLING INTERESTS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
FROM EUROPEAN FIRMS2 
(Paper 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
2
 This paper was submitted to the Spanish Journal of  Finance and Accounting  (ISSN: 0210-2412). This 
journal is indexed in Social Sciences Citation Index  (Web of Kowledge, Thomson-Reuters) and in several 
others. We are waiting for comments from the reviewers.  
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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the characteristics of firms reporting Non-Controlling Interests 
(NCI) in fourteen European countries. We find that size, leverage, profitability and 
country legal origin play an important role in explaining the likelihood of use and report 
NCI in consolidated financial statements. This study allows us to identify the major 
players affected by the accounting standards on matters related to NCI, whose financial 
ratios should be carefully analyzed for comparative purposes. We also provide additional 
insights that could be helpful for future research on the valuation implications of NCI 
reported on the consolidated financial statements. 
 
 
Keywords: Non-controlling interests, country legal origin, firm characteristics  
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The IASB standards on business combinations and consolidation have been revised 
in the last years in order to ensure that consolidated financial statements are prepared 
according to the entity theory as defined by some theorists (e.g. Paton and Littleton, 1940; 
Kam, 1990; Schroeder et al., 2001). The new IASB standards require changes on the 
recognition and measurement of Non-controlling interests
3
 (NCI), as well as on the 
accounting treatment of equity transactions between controlling and non-controlling 
interests. These changes in the way as NCI are reported could have a significant impact in 
the consolidated financial statements of European listed firms with partially owned 
subsidiaries.  
By the time of the mandatory adoption of IASB standards by European listed firms, 
two important changes related to NCI takes place. For one hand, that version of IAS 27, 
Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements (IASB, 2003) requires NCI to be 
presented within equity, instead of a hybrid element presented separately from liabilities 
and from equity. For another hand, the IFRS 3, Business combinations (IASB, 2004), 
requires NCI to be measured by the proportion share of the pre-acquisition fair values of 
the identifiable net assets of the subsidiary, instead of their book values.  
After the completion of the project on Business Combinations developed by the 
IASB jointly with the FASB, there were some other important changes related to NCI. 
The new version of IFRS 3 (IASB, 2008a) allows firms to measure NCI either at fair 
value (including goodwill) or at the proportion share of the fair values of the identifiable 
net assets (excluding goodwill). Additionally, the more recent version of the IAS 27 
                                                     
3
 Recent amendments to accounting standards replace ‘minority interests’ by ‘non-controlling interests´ in 
order to make this concept consistent with the definition of subsidiary. Given that nowadays the owner of a 
minority interest might control an entity and consolidate it, it seems to be more appropriate to use the term 
“non-controlling-interests”.  
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(IASB, 2008b)
4
 require that changes in a parent’s ownership interest in a subsidiary that 
do not result in a loss of control should be accounted for as equity transactions.  
These amendments could have a significant impact on financial statement analysis. 
John Formica, a partner of PricewaterhouseCoopers, says the new standards employs a 
different premise for reporting consolidated financial results, since now all shareholders - 
even those with a minority stake in a partially owned subsidiary - are viewed as equity 
holders in the consolidated financial statements of the parent company. The statement of 
financial position will, therefore, look better by having less leverage (Whitehouse, 2009). 
Charles Mulford, director of the Georgia Tech Financial Analysis Lab, with a sample of 
firms in United States, found significant increases in shareholders’ equity and interest 
coverage ratio, as well as some decreases in liabilities to shareholders’ equity ratio 
(Mulford and Quinn, 2008) with the adoption of new standards on accounting for NCI. 
Similar arguments are offered by Silliman (2008), Platt (2008), Whitehouse (2009) and 
Deitrick (2010). 
   Investors must therefore be aware of changes on ratios, such as the return on 
equity, return on assets or financial leverage, derived only from differences in accounting 
procedures, despite a lack of any actual change in their underlying economic profile. 
Creditors would probably need to revise their debt covenants. This is true not only 
because of potential diminish of debt, but also due to incremental total (fair value) assets, 
including goodwill. In this context, financial ratios should be carefully analyzed for 
comparative purposes. It is important to know which firms are most likely to be affected 
by these issues.  
We are not aware of any study that previously has documented the characteristics of 
firms reporting NCI. Given the potential impact of this hybrid element for comparative 
                                                     
4
 As stated, IASB has also issued in May 2011 the IFRS 10, Consolidated Financial Statements, which has 
superseded the requirements relating to consolidated financial statements in IAS 27. However, it is not 
effective yet, and there isn´t changes to NCI or other subjects that could adjust our main research and 
results. Actually, IAS 27 covers Consolidated and Separate financial statements, and, from January 2013, 
IAS 27 will include only requirements to Separated Financial Statements, being the part of Consolidated 
Financial Statements moved for IFRS 10, which comprises all the subjects mentions to IAS 27 included in 
this thesis. 
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financial ratios analysis, we aim to investigate the characteristics of firms reporting NCI, 
in order to identify the pattern of use of subsidiaries partially owned by European firms. 
The empirical analysis relies on a sample of 3.463 listed firms from fourteen European 
countries. To accomplish our goal, firstly we perform univariate comparisons based on 
descriptive statistics and tests to the equality for the central tendency measures in the case 
of continuous variables, and tests of equality of proportions in case of binary variables. 
Secondly, the univariate comparisons are complemented by the estimation of one logistic 
regression, to conclude about the interrelations between the independent variables and 
their impact on the probability of reporting NCI in the consolidated statement of financial 
position. 
Our findings provide strong evidence supporting the importance of country and firm 
characteristics in explaining the use of NCI. The probability of reporting NCI in French-
civil-law countries is higher and in Common-law countries is lower, when compared to 
Scandinavian/German-civil-law countries, the benchmark group. These results can be 
justified by existing theories on the level of investor protection and its consequences on 
the ability to expropriate or to share wealth with NCI. Additionally, we provide empirical 
evidence that larger firms, leveraged firms and profitable firms are more likely to use and 
report NCI in their consolidated financial statements.   
This study contributes to financial statements users by identifying the major players 
that are affected by the accounting standards on matters related to NCI. The way as NCI 
was and is now reported could induce significant errors when comparing financial ratios, 
either between different firms or between different time periods for the same firm. 
Analysts need to be cautious when analyzing consolidated financial statements, when 
performing time-series analyses, and when forecasting future values for key variables. 
Additionally, we provide new insights that could be helpful for future research on 
the valuation implications of NCI reported on the statement of financial position. The 
little extant literature on NCI relates to their value relevance and provides mixed results 
(e.g. Abad et al., 2000; So and Smith, 2009). Abad et al (2000) find weak support for a 
positive association between NCI and the market value of the parent shareholders equity. 
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By contrast, So and Smith (2009) provide empirical evidence that NCI are negatively 
associated with the parent shareholder’s market value of equity when they are reported as 
a “mezzanine item” between liability and equity, and no significant relation when NCI are 
reported as equity. A possible explanation for these mixed results is that they do not 
consider the interaction between firm’s characteristics and NCI. Our findings provide 
empirical evidence that could be incorporated when analyzing the market valuation of 
NCI. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
accounting rules for NCI and the main changes towards the adoption of the entity theory. 
Section 2.3 describes the research design. Section 2.4 details the empirical results, and 
Section 2.5 presents summary and conclusions. 
 
2.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.2.1. Accounting for Non-Controlling Interests 
When business combinations are carried out by partial acquisitions, NCI should be 
recognized and measured in the consolidated financial statements of the combined entity. 
NCI are defined in IAS 27, Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements (IASB, 
2003) and in SFAS 160, Noncontrolling Interests in Consolidated Financial Statements 
(FASB, 2007a) as the equity in a subsidiary not attributable, directly or indirectly, to a 
parent. How NCI should be recognized and measured depends of the theory underling the 
preparation of consolidated financial statements.   
According to prior literature (e.g. Moonitz, 1942; Baxter and Spinney, 1975; Kam, 
1990; Clark, 1993; Schroeder et al., 2001; Nurnberg, 2001; Scofield, 1996), there are four 
major consolidation concepts underling the preparation of consolidated financial 
statements, namely, the proprietary concept, the entity concept, the parent company 
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concept and the parent's extension concept. These major concepts can be aggregated in 
two alternative theories, commonly identified as the parent company theory and the entity 
theory. 
The parent company theory emphasis ownership through a controlling shareholding 
interest, and regards the purpose of consolidated financial statements as being primarily 
for the information of the shareholders of the parent (Davies et al., 1997). Accordingly to 
this theory, NCI should be reported as non-equity in the consolidated statement of 
financial position, inside liabilities or between equity and liabilities (usually referred as a 
mezzanine section). They should be measured at their proportion in the pre-acquisition 
carrying amount of the subsidiary’s assets and liabilities. The consolidated statement of 
financial position is like an extension of the parent company´s statement of financial 
position, where the parent company´s investment in the subsidiary is replaced by the 
subsidiary’s assets, liabilities and NCI. 
The entity theory focuses on the existence of the group as an economic unit, rather 
than looking at it only through the eyes of the parent shareholders. It concentrates on the 
resources controlled by the entity and makes no distinction between the treatments given 
to different classes of shareholders (Davies et al., 1997). Therefore, according to this 
theory, NCI should be reported as equity and measured at their proportion in the fair 
value of the subsidiary’s assets and liabilities at the acquisition date. The consolidated 
statement of financial position represents a set of assets and liabilities managed as a 
whole. NCI represents the stockholder ownership interest in the subsidiary held by parties 
other than the parent company.  
In the last years, the main accounting standards setters have been converging in 
order to require consolidated financial statements to be prepared according to the entity 
theory. However, there was no consensual position across different standards setters and 
different moments of time.  
The main standard in the USA regarding accounting for NCI is the Accounting 
Research Bulletin (ARB) 51, Consolidated Financial Statements, issued in 1959 (CAP, 
Determinants and market assessment of non-controlling interests reported on financial statements 
 
 
 
  
  
Chapter2 – Characteristics of firm reporting non-controlling interests: empirical… … 
 
18 
 
1959). The first version of this standard did establish neither the nature and the 
classification, nor the measurement, of NCI in the consolidated statement of financial 
position. Therefore, considerable diversity in practice existed and the so-called “minority 
interests” were reported as liabilities or in the mezzanine section (FASB, 2007a), 
measured at an amount that does not include the differences between fair values and 
carrying amounts of the identifiable net assets of the subsidiary on the acquisition date 
(FASB/IASB, 2005). This traditional solution focused on NCI as outsiders, described as a 
“leveraging technique” used by the parent in the sense that NCI finances assets controlled 
by the parent without making contractual debt service claims on the parent (FASB, 1991).  
The FASB started, in 1996, a project on Business Combination that would be 
expected to be developed in several phases. The second phase was taken jointly with 
IASB and was concluded by 2007. An amendment to the ARB 51 emerged through the 
SFAS 160 (2007), adding a new section named “noncontrolling interests in subsidiaries”, 
in which the nature and classification of NCI is perfectly established (FASB, 2007a). NCI 
should be reported within equity, albeit separately from the parent’s equity. Purchase or 
sales of NCI that do not result in a change in control are now accounted for as equity 
transactions, contrary to prior absence of guidance on this issue. Additionally, by revising 
in 2007 the SFAS 141, Business Combinations (FASB, 2007b), which had been issued in 
2001, the FASB is now requiring all firms to measure NCI at their fair value. The US 
GAAPs are thus finally consistent with the entity theory.  
The IASB standards also have evolved in order to require consolidated financial 
statements to be prepared according to the entity theory. The first standard on this issue 
was IAS 3, Consolidated Financial Statements (IASC, 1976), but just defined “minority 
interest” without any specification concerning recognition and measurement. In 1989, the 
IAS 3 was superseded by the IAS 27, Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting 
for Investments in Subsidiaries (IASC, 1989), which continues to require the so-called 
minority interests to be presented separately from liabilities and from equity, as a hybrid 
element. However, the revised version of IAS 27 issued in 2003 started to require the so-
called minority interests to be presented as equity.  
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More recently, the current version of IAS 27 issued in 2008 (IASB, 2008b) also 
require (in the absence of prior guidance) the changes in a parent’s ownership interest in a 
subsidiary that do not result in a loss of control to are accounted for as equity 
transactions. Any difference between NCI adjustments and the fair value of the 
consideration paid (or received) shall be recognized directly in equity and attributed to the 
owners of the parent. The first IASB standard concerning NCI measurement issues is the 
IAS 22, Business Combinations (IASC, 1983), which allow firms to measure NCI by the 
proportion share of either the carrying amounts or the fair values of the identifiable net 
assets of the subsidiary on the acquisition date.  
When the IASB entered into the Business Combination project, taken jointly with 
FASB, the IAS 22 was superseded by a new standard on this issue, the IFRS 3, Business 
Combinations (IASB, 2004), which require the NCI to be measured by the proportion 
share of the pre-acquisition fair values of the identifiable net assets of the subsidiary. 
After the completion of the joint project, the IASB issued a new version of IFRS 3 (IASB, 
2008a), which allows the acquirer to measure NCI either at fair value (including 
goodwill) or by the proportion share of the pre-acquisition fair values of the identifiable 
net assets of the subsidiary (excluding goodwill), whereas SFAS 141 (FASB, 2007b) 
requires the NCI to be measured only at fair value (including goodwill). Therefore, in 
contrast with the US GAAP, the IASB standards are not yet fully consistent with the 
entity theory. 
 
2.2.2 Impact of Changes in Accounting Rules for Non-Controlling 
Interests 
The main changes in the accounting rules for NCI could have a significant impact 
on financial statement analysis.  Whitehouse (2009) says that the statement of financial 
position, after the inclusion of NCI inside equity, is looking better by having less 
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leverage. John Formica, a partner of PricewaterhouseCoopers, justifies this argument as 
the new standards employ a different premise for reporting consolidated financial results. 
He recall that under the current standards all shareholders - even those with a minority 
stake in a partially owned subsidiary - are viewed as equity holders in the consolidated 
financial statements of the parent company.  
Charles Mulford, director of the Georgia Tech Financial Analysis Lab, looked at the 
likely effect of implementing equivalent to the IASB standards on the reporting of NCI in 
United States and found significant increases in shareholders’ equity and interest 
coverage ratio, as well as some decreases in liabilities to shareholders’ equity ratio 
(Mulford and Quinn, 2008).  Similar results were found by Urbancic (2008), who justifies 
that lenders and credit analysts must recognize the possibility that their previous 
assessment of a borrower’s credit profile could be altered.  
Creditors probably need to revise their debt covenants according to the inclusion of 
NCI in equity. Sean Callaghan and Marie Treacy, both partners in Ernst & Young, 
advices to not forget to consider the new accounting standards early in all contract 
negotiations to avoid reporting transactions differently to their intended outcome and to 
consider the impact on debt covenants and, eventually, in remuneration packages 
(Callaghan and Treacy, 2008). A report of Ernst & Young (2010) also states that 
accounting effects and the consequential impact of the new accounting standards on NCI 
might be significant enough for management to consider restructuring the financial 
contracts.  
Investors also need to be aware of changes on ratios, such as the return on equity, 
return on assets or financial leverage (Urbancic, 2008; Henry et al, 2008), derived only 
from differences in accounting procedures, despite a lack of any actual change in their 
underlying economic profile. Henry et al (2008) and Deitrick (2010) recall that this 
awareness is extensible to analysts in the computation of leverage ratios. Scofield (1996), 
in an experimental study, focus not only on leverage ratios, but compared other ratios 
produced under the way how NCI are reported on financial statements. He suggests 
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financial statements without the inclusion of NCI in equity are relevant for specific share 
recommendation by financial analysts, but when NCI are included in equity it emphasizes 
the single management of the entire group, indicating indicates that NCI can be relevant 
for assessing the group’s performance. This is due to the fact that a prediction of future 
performance of the group is affected not only by how well or poorly the parent company 
itself is performing but also the subsidiaries as well.  
Deitrick (2010), a KPMG Faculty Fellow, notices that because the location of NCI 
in equity undoubtedly change the debt-to-equity and similar ratios of several consolidated 
companies, either in European Countries as in United States, analysts are advised to 
consistently prepare and evaluate debt-to-equity and related measures when performing 
time-series analyses of them, especially if computerized databases are being used. They 
say that how databases will address the problem of inconsistent time-series measures is 
unclear. As a result of these and other changes brought, analysts need to be cautious when 
analyzing consolidated financial information, when performing time-series analyses, and 
when forecasting future values for key variables. 
 
 
2.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
2.3.1. Sample and data 
Our analysis relies on firms listed in at least one European country, excluding 
eastern countries as well as countries with less than 40 firms with information available in 
the Thomson Worldscope Database. The sample includes firms from all industries, except 
the financial sector (SIC 6). The accounting and market data used in the empirical 
analysis is that reported on the 2009 consolidated financial statements. These data were 
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collected from the Thomson Worldscope Database. After excluding firms that lacked 
sufficient data, as well as firms with negative book value or negative NCI, 3.463 valid 
firm observations remained.  
Table 2.1 presents the sample distribution across countries and industries. In terms 
of country representation, the highest concentration was firms from the UK (32%), 
followed by firms from Germany, France and Sweden which represent 33% of the sample 
(around 10% each). Common-law countries, Scandinavian/German-civil-law countries 
and French-civil-law countries represent, respectively, around one third of the sample. 
Finally, the industry classification shows that the industrial sector is the most dominant 
with 42%, followed by the services sector which represents 26% of the sample.  
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TABLE 2.1 
 Sample distribution across countries and industries 
  Mining Industrial Utilities Commercial Services 
All 
firms 
All firms 
(%) 
Common-law countries                 
    United Kingdom 224 331 89 106 331 1.081 31% 
    Ireland 16 12 6 3 6 43 1% 
     240 343 95 109 337 1.124 32% 
  Scandinavian/German-civil-law             
    Denmark 7 47 14 5 18 91 3% 
    Finland 7 64 8 7 22 108 3% 
    Germany 17 231 45 29 132 454 13% 
    Norway 42 56 25 8 17 148 4% 
    Sweden 29 140 26 22 96 313 9% 
    Switzerland 3 85 12 11 25 136 4% 
  105 623 130 82 310 1.250 36% 
  French-civil-law                 
    Belgium 4 45 12 8 18 87 3% 
    France 19 167 35 46 125 392 11% 
    Greece 23 97 21 48 28 217 6% 
    Italy 14 104 38 12 27 195 6% 
    Netherlands 10 46 7 10 31 104 3% 
    Spain 15 46 17 5 11 94 3% 
     85 505 130 129 240 1.089 31% 
                
    All countries 430 1.471 355 320 887 3.463 100% 
    All countries (%) 12% 42% 10% 9% 26% 100%   
 
 
 
2.3.2. Methodology 
To accomplish our goal in the investigation of characteristics of firms reporting 
NCI, firstly we perform univariate comparisons. In order to investigate the importance of 
country legal origin in explaining the use of NCI, we compute the percentage of firms 
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with and without NCI in each country, as well as in each of the groups of countries based 
on legal origin, the Common-law, Scandinavian/German-civil-law and French-civil-law 
countries. Next, we perform the test of equality of proportions. In order to investigate the 
importance of other firm characteristics in explaining the use of NCI, we compute 
descriptive statistics for a set of firm-level variables (size, leverage and profitability) 
separately for each group of firms, those reporting and those not reporting NCI in the 
consolidated statement of financial position. After that, we compare these two groups in 
terms of firm characteristics by applying the equality of means parametric t-test, and the 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney test when the normality of the variance equality 
assumptions underlying the t-test are not met.  
Secondly, the univariate comparisons are complemented by the estimation of one 
logistic regression. With this econometric model, conclusions can be drawn about the 
interrelations between the independent variables and their impact on the probability of 
reporting NCI in the consolidated statement of financial position. The equation of the 
logistic regression is: 
 
 
 3i32i21i1 XβX.βXβα3i2i1iii e1
1
X,X,X|1Y E1)(Y P

         (1) 
 
where e represents the exponential function and  
Y = NCI; 
X1j = Country-level variables, with j = 1, 2; 
X2j = Firm-level variables, with j = 1, 2, 3; 
X3j = Industry dummy variables, with j = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
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The dependent variable, NCI, is a binary variable which assumes the value 1 if the 
firm reports NCI in the consolidated statement of financial position and 0 otherwise.  
The country-level variables are COMMON and FRENCH, two binary variables 
which assume the value 1 if the firms is located, respectively, in a Common-law or in a 
French-civil-law country. If the coefficients on these variables are statistically significant 
it means in the Common-Law (or French-civil-Law) countries the percentage of firms 
reporting NCI in their consolidated statement of financial position is significantly 
different when compared to the Scandinavian/German-civil-law countries.  
Previous literature has suggested that legal tradition affects both the explicit laws 
protecting minority shareholder rights and the net effect of these laws on a corporation’s 
ability to receive financing (La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000)). In particular, this 
literature has documented that Common-law countries protect minority shareholders’ 
rights better than Civil-law countries. Within the Civil-law countries, French-civil-law 
provides significantly less protection for shareholders, while the German and 
Scandinavian traditions provide an intermediate level of protection. We are testing 
whether the legal origin can explain the probability of reporting NCI and, thus, the 
relation between country characteristics and the pattern of use of NCI in Europe.   
The firm-level variables are SIZE, LEV and ROE, where SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization, LEV is total liabilities divided by the parent 
shareholder’s equity and ROE is return on equity attributable to the parent shareholders. 
None of these variables includes values attributable to NCI. Previous literature has 
suggested that these three firm characteristics affect accounting choices, accounting 
quality and economic behavior (e.g. Lourenço and Curto, 2010; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 
2006; Artiach et al., 2010). We are testing whether these firm characteristics could also 
explain the probability of reporting NCI and, thus, the pattern of use of NCI in Europe. 
Swanson (2010) uses size to justify differences in the value relevance of NCI, Frank and 
Harden (2001) refers to profitability as a determinant of disinvestment and Mulford and 
Quinn (2008), Urbancic (2008), Deitrick (2010), among others, mention the relation 
between leverage and NCI accounting.  
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2.4. RESULTS 
 
2.4.1. Univariate comparisons 
Table 2.2 reports analysis of data on the use of NCI by country. Panel A presents 
the number and the proportion of firms with and without NCI in each country as well as 
in each group of countries based on legal origin. Panel B presents the results of the tests 
of equality of proportions.  
 
TABLE 2.2 
 Analysis of data on the use of NCI by country 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Firms 
without 
NCI % 
Firms  
with NCI % All firms 
  Common-law       
    United Kingdom 815 75% 266 25% 1.081 
    Ireland 32 74% 11 26% 43 
     847 75% 277 25% 1.124 
  Scandinavian/German-civil-law      
    Denmark 52 57% 39 43% 91 
    Finland 51 47% 57 53% 108 
    Germany 194 43% 260 57% 454 
    Norway 80 54% 68 46% 148 
    Sweden 211 67% 102 33% 313 
    Switzerland 68 50% 68 50% 136 
 656 53% 594 47% 1.250 
 (continued on next page) 
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TABLE 2.2 (Continued) 
French-civil-law      
    Belgium 41 47% 46 53% 87 
    France 108 28% 284 72% 392 
    Greece 83 38% 134 62% 217 
    Italy 51 26% 144 74% 195 
    Netherlands 46 44% 58 56% 104 
    Spain 23 24% 71 76% 94 
     352 32% 737 68% 1.089 
     
  All countries 1.856 54% 1.607 46% 3.463 
    
   
Panel B: Test for the equality of proportions 
 
  Test p-value 
Common-law vs Scandinavian/German-civil-law -11.881 0.000 
Common-law vs French-civil-law  -22.509 0.000 
Scandinavian/German-civil-law vs French-civil-law -10.024 0.000 
 
 
There is a large cross-country variation in the proportion of firms reporting NCI in 
the consolidated statement of financial position. The proportion of firms with NCI is 
lower in Common-law countries when compared to the proportion in 
Scandinavian/German-civil-law countries (25% vs 47%) which in turn is significantly 
lower than in French-civil-law countries (47% vs 68%). The results of the tests of 
equality of proportions presented in Panel B show that all of these differences are 
statistically significant. Therefore, the univariate analysis provides preliminary evidence 
supporting the role of country in explaining the use of NCI by European firms. 
Table 2.3 reports statistical results on the relation between the use of NCI and firm 
characteristics for the entire sample and for each sub-sample of countries based on legal-
origin. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the firm-level variables separately for 
each of the two groups of firms, those reporting and those not reporting NCI in the 
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consolidated statement of financial position. Panel B presents the results of the 
comparison tests. When considering the entire sample, the means of SIZE, LEV and ROE 
are higher for firms reporting NCI, when compared to firms without NCI (SIZE: 12.636 
vs 10.925; LEV: 2.820 vs 1.858; ROE: 0.007 vs -0.140). Similar results are found when 
each of the three groups of countries is separately analyzed. The results of the comparison 
tests presented in Panel B show that all of the mean differences are statistically 
significant. Therefore, the univariate analysis also provides preliminary evidence 
supporting the role of firm characteristics in explaining the use of NCI by European 
firms.  
TABLE 2.3 
 Relation between the use of NCI and firm characteristics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
     Firms without 
NCI       Firms with NCI  All firms  
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
    Common-law       
        SIZE 10.088 9.826 12.275 12.244 10.627 10.206 
        LEV 1.578 0.728 2.805 1.405 1.880 0.836 
        ROE -0.181 -0.010 0.042 0.080 -0.126 0.012 
   Scandinavian/German-civil-law     
        SIZE 12.016 11.942 13.199 13.110 12.578 12.399 
        LEV 2.203 0.859 2.171 1.440 2.188 1.132 
        ROE -0.140 0.014 -0.012 0.052 -0.079 0.035 
    French-civil-law       
        SIZE 10.905 11.812 12.318 12.150 11.862 11.601 
        LEV 1.890 1.068 3.349 1.733 2.877 1.493 
        ROE -0.045 0.022 0.009 0.044 -0.008 0.039 
    All countries       
        SIZE 10.925 10.739 12.636 12.500 11.719 11.447 
        LEV 1.858 0.828 2.820 1.528 2.305 1.134 
        ROE -0.140 0.008 0.007 0.053 -0.072 0.031 
 
(continued) 
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TABLE 2.3 (Continued) 
Panel B: Comparison test 
  Test p-value 
 
Common-law    
 
   SIZE  -12.223 0.000 
 
   LEV  -8.094 0.000 
 
   ROE  -7.052 0.000 
 
Scandinavian/German-civil-law    
 
   SIZE  -8.721 0.000 
 
   LEV  -9.305 0.000 
 
   ROE  -3.178 0.000 
 
French-civil-law    
   SIZE  -9.876 0.000 
 
   LEV  -8.014 0.000 
 
   ROE  -2.894 0.000 
 
 
All countries   
   SIZE  -20.412 0.000 
 
   LEV  -18.076 0.000 
 
   ROE  -8.213 0.000   
 
 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s end of the year market capitalization; LEV is the firm’s end of the year total 
liabilities divided by end-of-year parent shareholders’ equity; ROE is the return on equity attributable to the parent 
shareholders. N = 3.463. 
 
2.4.2. Logistic regression 
To obtain more powerful statistical support, we incorporate the country-level and 
the firm-level variables into a logistic regression model with industry effects. Table 2.4 
reports the parameter estimates from the logistic regression where the dependent variable 
(NCI) assumes the values 1 and 0 if the consolidated statement of financial position, 
respectively, reports or not report NCI. The regression in column C1 includes all the 
covariates. Column C2 includes only the country-level variables, considering the partition 
of countries in three groups based on legal origin (Common-law vs. Scandinavia/German-
law vs French-civil law). Finally, C3 includes only the three firm-level variables (size, 
leverage and profitability).  
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The results presented in Table 2.4 provide strong evidence supporting the relation 
between country and firm characteristics in explaining the use of NCI by European firms.  
 
TABLE 2.4 
Regression Results 
 C1 C2 C3 
   Intercept -3.986*** -0.008 -3.698*** 
   COMMON -0.494*** -0.998***  
   FRENCH 1.154*** 0.860***  
   SIZE 0.312***  0.312*** 
   LEV 0.032***  0.042*** 
   ROE 0.407***  0.486*** 
   Minning&Construction -0.012 0.054 -0.326*** 
   Utilities -0.019 0.253** -0.060 
   Commercial -0.539*** -0.475*** -0.502*** 
   Services -0.169* -0.372 -0.289*** 
    
   LR statistic  836*** 466*** 531*** 
   Nagelkerke R
2
  0.287 0.168 0.190 
    
 
Dependent variable: NCI which assumes the value 1 if consolidated statement of financial position reports NCI and 0 
otherwise.  
 
Independent variables: COMMON is an indicator that equals 1 if the firm is located in a Common-law country and 0 
otherwise; FRENCH is an indicator that equals 1 if the firm is located in a French-civil-law country and 0 otherwise; 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s end of the year market capitalization; LEV is the firm’s end of the year total 
liabilities divided by end-of-year parent shareholders’ equity; ROE is the return on equity attributable to the parent 
shareholders. N = 3.463. 
 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively. 
 
 
 
The estimated coefficients on the variables FRENCH (C1: 1.154; C2: 0.860) and 
COMMON (C1: -0.494; C2: -0.998) are, respectively, positive and negative and they are 
both statistically significant. Thus, we conclude that the estimated probability of reporting 
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NCI in the Common-law countries (French-law-countries) is statistically lower (higher) 
when compared to the Scandinavian-German-civil-law countries, the benchmark variable.  
A likely explanation for this finding is as follows. When ownership is concentrated, 
an agency conflict can be found between the controlling shareholders and the minority 
interest holders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Controlling shareholders may seek private 
benefits at the expense of non-controlling shareholders, by freezing out minority 
shareholders, by engaging in related-party transactions and through managerial 
entrenchment (Ali et al., 2007). 
As this is true for shareholders of one single entity, some caution must be putted in 
the presence of a group of entities. The cash flow benefits that parent block holders stand 
to realize are inversely linked to its level of ownership in the subsidiary. In fact, parent 
realizes no cash flow benefits by expropriation from a wholly owned subsidiary because 
any gains the parent makes are negated by the equivalent loss in subsidiary value 
(Atanasov et al., 2010). As the parent’s ownership stake decreases, the proportional 
potential gain from expropriating increases, although expropriation is more critical where 
NCI are weaken protected.   
Prior literature documents that under strong investor protection, the parent is forced 
to shoulder the costs of control alone while being forced to share the benefits of control 
with the minority shareholders, being the latter allowed to free ride at the controller’s 
expense (Dammann, 2008). Also, strengthening investor protection produces a significant 
wealth redistribution effect from controlling shareholders to outside shareholders 
(Albuquerque and Wang, 2008). By contrast, under weaker investor protection private 
benefits of control are higher (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 2003). For lower levels 
of investor protection, controlling shareholders have the power to pursue private benefits 
of control at expenses of minority shareholders, without constrains imposed by investors 
protection including corporate laws and their enforcement. According to the literature, 
thus, NCI will be more costly to firms in countries where they are better protected and it 
is likely that a company only recourse to NCI when the benefits outweigh the costs, 
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justifying our results for the role of country characteristics on the pattern of use of NCI in 
Europe. 
Regarding the firm-level variables, the results presented in Table 2.4 show that the 
estimated coefficients on the variables SIZE (C1: 0.312; C3: 0.312), LEV (C1: 0.032; C3: 
0.042) and ROE (C1: 0.407; C3: 0.486) are all positive and statistically significant. Thus, 
we can conclude that larger firms, leveraged firms and profitable firms are more likely to 
reporting NCI in the consolidated statement of financial position. There may be some 
reasons for these findings. First, larger firms seems to have the financial power and 
market presence to refinance themselves more easily and it appears that NCI provide 
useful additional resources to them, being kept if they are useful and eliminated when 
they are detrimental (Swanson, 2010).  
By another hand, a higher leverage can lead a firm to violate debt covenants 
(Nicolaev, 2010) and NCI can be an alternative source of finance provided they are 
classified as equity and do not increase the indebtness. In fact, Platt (2008), a financial 
writing in Global Finance, says that the continued instability in the financial services 
industry continues to obstruct covenant activity. He points that in the current credit 
market, where access to syndicated loans to finance large transactions is limited, private 
equity firms look for alternative ways to deploy capital, partnering with NCI. Thus, a 
possible explanation for parent firms to use NCI relates to the providence of additional 
resources to entity group without adding to the leverage, especially if they are not 
included in debt.   
Concerning profitability, a possible explanation for our findings is that when 
economic performance is high firms are more likely to invest in diversified activities that 
involve pooling of complementary resources and skills, which could involve the use of 
NCI. This result can be also linked to the study of Ernst & Young (2010) pointing firms 
could prefer to leave NCI in subsidiaries to incentive former shareholders/executives for 
the entity to continue performing well. 
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Finally, the results presented in Table 2.4 also allow us to conclude about the 
relative role of firm and country characteristics in explaining the use of NCI in Europe. 
By comparing the results presented in columns C2 and C3 with those in column C1, we 
find that either country-level or firm-level variables have significant incremental 
explanatory power over the competing set of variables.  
 
2.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The IASB standards on business combinations and consolidation have been revised 
in the last years in order to ensure that consolidated financial statements are prepared 
according to the entity theory. The changes in the way as NCI are reported could have a 
significant impact in the financial analysis of European listed firms with partially owned 
subsidiaries. Return on assets, return on equity, and financial leverage, among others, 
could be different according to the way as NCI are reported. Although there are some 
studies (e.g., Scofield, 1996; Mulford and Quinn, 2008) drawing  attention on these 
differences, we are not aware of any study that previously have provided insights on the 
European firms that have more likelihood of being affected by accounting standards on 
matters regarding NCI reporting.  
This empirical research investigates the characteristics of firms reporting NCI, in 
order to identify the pattern of use of subsidiaries partially owned by European firms. 
Using a sample of 3.463 firms’ observations from fourteen countries, we find that country 
and firm characteristics play an important role in explaining the use of NCI in Europe. 
This study provide empirical evidence that the probability of reporting NCI is higher for 
firms located in a Common-law country and lower for firms located in a French-civil-law 
country, with firms located in a Scandinavian/German-civil-law country placed in the 
middle. Additionally, we provide evidence that larger firms, leveraged firms and 
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profitable firms are more likely to use and report NCI in their consolidated financial 
statements.  
The NCI will be more costly to firms in those countries where they are better 
protected and it is likely that a firm recourse to NCI only when the benefits outweigh the 
costs, justifying our results for the role of country characteristics on the pattern of use of 
NCI in Europe. Additionally, larger firms can have the financial power and market 
presence to refinance easily and it appears that NCI provide useful additional resources, 
being kept if they are useful and eliminated when they are detrimental. Also, higher 
leverage can lead a firm to violate debt covenants and partnering with NCI can be an 
alternative source of finance provided they are classified as equity and do not increase the 
indebtness. As well, when economic performance is high firms are more likely to invest 
in diversified activities that involve pooling of complementary resources and skills, which 
could involve the use of NCI, and their monitoring can be an incentive for former 
shareholders/executives to continue performing well. 
These findings are of interests not only to firms that report NCI, but also to analysts, 
academics and other users of financial statements. Prior to the effectiveness of new 
revised standards on NCI accounting, there was a strong debate about the benefits and the 
financial consequences of considering NCI as an element of equity measured at fair value. 
This study offers a unique opportunity to analyze which firm and country characteristics 
can be determinants to the pattern of use of NCI and, thus, in which countries the revision 
standards have a major impact and on which firms caution must be kept for comparative 
financial ratios purposes. Additionally, we provide new insights that could be helpful for 
future research on the valuation implications of NCI reported on the consolidated 
statement of financial position.  
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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines whether the market values Non-Controlling Interests (NCI) in 
a different way depending on the institutional environment of the parent company. Our 
empirical study relies on a set of firms from five European countries whose legal origin 
provides different levels of investor protection. Our results present empirical evidence of 
a negative association between NCI and the market value of the parent companies shares 
in those countries whose legal origin provides relatively strong investor protection. By 
contrast, our findings indicate that NCI are positively associated with the market value in 
those countries whose legal origin provides relatively weaker investor protection.  An 
explanation for these findings can rely on the manner as the market views this alternative 
source of finance equity: as additional capital with wealth share characteristics or with 
wealth expropriation possibilities at expenses of non-controlling shareholders. Thus, it 
seems that legal origin play a significant role to understand cross-country differences in 
the value relevance of NCI. 
 
Key words: Non-controlling interests, value relevance, investor protection, legal 
origin. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines whether the market values Non-Controlling Interests (NCI) in 
a different way depending on the institutional environment of the parent company. More 
precisely, we examine whether the association between NCI and the market value of 
parent company´s shares is different across countries whose legal origin provides 
different levels of investor protection. 
Attention to the NCI accounting has recently being strengthened by the 
development of new standards issued by International Financial Accounting Standards 
(IASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the scope of their jointly 
project on business combinations. Current standards are supported on the basis that NCI 
should be reported within equity in the consolidated statement of financial position, 
although separately from the equity of the owners of the parent company. It is assumed 
that NCI participate proportionally in the risks and rewards of an investment in the 
subsidiary.  
An extensive accounting literature justifies that NCI represent an ownership interest 
in the combined entity, consistent with the entity theory (e.g., e.g. Moonitz, 1942; Baxter 
and Spinney, 1975; Kam, 1990; Clark, 1993; Schoroeder et al., 2001; Nurnberg, 2001; 
Scofield, 2003). By another hand well established literature state that differences in legal 
origin are associated with different levels of investor protection (e.g., La Porta et al 1997, 
1998, 2008), and a widespread financial literature relies on the relation between majority 
and minority shareholders supporting the opportunity to extract private benefits (e.g. La 
Porta et al, 1997, 1998; Bozec and Laurin, 2008; Hughes, 2009; Atanasov, Boone and 
Haushalter, 2010; Lin et al, 2011).  
However, there is just a slight stream of literature concerning the value relevance of 
the amounts of NCI reported on consolidated financial statements (e.g. Abad et al, 2000; 
So and Smith, 2009; Swanson, 2010). These previous studies covers single countries and 
neither of them explored the mixed findings from the perspective of legal origin as a 
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cause for results’ diversity. We contribute to this scant stream of literature, by providing 
empirical evidence on the way as the market views NCI in a set of countries with 
different legal origin and, consequently, with different levels of investor protection. 
The empirical analysis relies on five European countries, namely, United Kingdom 
(common law), Sweden and Germany (Scandinavian/German-civil law), France and 
Greece (French-civil law)
6
. For each country, we select those firms applying IAS/IFRS 
that has been reporting NCI each year in the sample period 2008-2010.  
To achieve our aim, firstly we develop a country individual analysis. For each 
country we build up a research equation using Ordinary Least Square regressions (OLS) 
that links the firm´s market value to summary accounting measures and other 
information, including the NCI accounting numbers. We use two stage procedure of 
Heckman (1979) to control for firm self-selection bias. We find a positive association of 
NCI with share prices occurring in France and Greece, as opposed to a negative 
association in United Kingdom, as well as Sweden and Germany. These results suggest 
that the market values positively the NCI in French-civil law countries but negatively in 
Common-law and Scandinavian/German-civil law countries.  
Secondly, we put together firms from Common-law and from 
Scandinavian/German-civil law countries in order to find whether the market penalization 
of NCI is significantly different between these two groups of firms. Our final results show 
that the NCI in Scandinavian/German-civil law countries are negatively associated with 
share prices, although with a less penalization than in the Common law country. These 
findings suggest that the lower the investor protection environment, the more likelihood 
of a non-negative relation between NCI and share prices.  
Taken together, our findings confirms that NCI have explanatory power to share 
prices, but legal origin plays a significant role on the relation between the amount of NCI 
in subsidiaries and the market value of parent companies. A possible explanation for our 
                                                     
6
 Countries like Ireland (common law), Denmark, Finland and Norway (Scandinavian/German civil law), 
Belgium, Netherlands, Spain (French-civil law) were not included due to a scarce number of observations. 
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findings rely on the manner as the market views this alternative source of financing: as 
additional capital with ability to benefit parent company although with a higher costly 
effect, or, otherwise, as additional partners with ability to provide private benefits of 
control to parent company at expenses of non controlling shareholders.  
Theoretically, the first case is assigned to common law countries, typically with 
stronger investor protection environments. In these cases, parent shareholders face alone 
the costs of control but share the wealth benefits with other shareholders. The NCI 
generally can have a monitoring effect, can demand their stemming of the benefits of the 
combined business, and can free ride on the controlling shareholders wealth, meanwhile 
parent company shoulder alone the costs of control and costs of litigation, which could 
not compensate the potential benefits of using NCI as an alternative source of financing. 
By contrast, the second case is assigned to civil law countries, typically with a weaker 
investor protection environment, where parent companies access private benefits of 
control and can behave at expenses of NCI. In these latter cases, the costs of having NCI 
can be compensated by the benefits parent company expect to obtain if they are 
maintained in their capital structures. The Scandinavian/German civil-law countries 
follow the pattern for Common-law countries, although the market seems to not value 
NCI so negatively due to the slight lower level of investor protection, which in turns can 
put more equilibrium on the benefits and the costs assigned to the decision to have NCI.    
Our research on the relation between NCI and the market value of the parent 
company’s shares, as an assessment  for the way as the market prices those NCI reported 
on the consolidated statement of financial position, fills a gap in the empirical literature 
about NCI. More precisely, we add to early studies by combining the literature on value 
relevance with the literature on legal origin and minority shareholder protection as part of 
the institutional environment where firms develop financial and economic activities. 
Firstly, prior scant research has focused on the value relevance of NCI but just within one 
individual country, providing opposite results (e.g. Abad et al, 2000; So and Smith, 2009; 
Swanson, 2010). To our knowledge, this study is one of the first to explore cross-country 
differences using legal origin to draw conclusions about the relation between NCI and the 
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market value of parent companies. Secondly, our results contribute to the growing 
literature on international differences in firm´s environment factors. More precisely, it 
adds to the stream of research suggesting that a country´s institutional environment can 
lead to differences in the relation between prices, returns and accounting information 
reported (e.g  Ali and Hwang, 2000; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Boonlert-U-Thai, 
Meek and Nabar, 2006; Bae et al, 2007; DeFond, Hung and Trezevant, 2007; Hughes, 
2009; Rahman, Yammeesri and Perera, 2010; Landsman et al, 2011).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the literature 
review. In Section 3 we present the research design. Results and discussion are presented 
in Section 4. Finally, section 5 provides summary and conclusions.  
 
3.2. RELATED LITERATURE 
When pyramid ownership and business groups are formed, the equity which is not 
wholly owned (but controlled) by the shareholders of the parent company is in the hands 
of non-controlling shareholders, widely known as outside investors (in financial 
literature) or as non-controlling interests (in accounting literature
7
). The parent companies 
need to prepare consolidated financial statements and recognize the portion of the 
consolidated subsidiaries that are attributable to NCI. The way as NCI are recognized and 
measured depends on the theory underlying the preparation of those consolidated 
financial statements. 
There is an extensive theoretical accounting literature focusing the differences 
between several theories on consolidated financial reporting and in the interpretation of 
the accounting nature of the NCI itself. The main ones are the parent company theory and 
the entity theory (e.g Moonitz, 1942; Baxter and Spinney, 1975; Kam, 1990; Clark, 1993; 
Schoroeder et al., 2001; Nurnberg, 2001; Scofield, 2003). Theoretically NCI range from 
                                                     
7
 To be precise, until recently accounting standards referred to the element as “minority shareholders”. 
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being perceived as equivalent to liabilities from the viewpoint of the parent-company 
shareholders or being perceived as a part of consolidated stockholders’ equity (Beams et 
al, 2011).  
Whilst the parent company theory had been widespread around the world, current 
international accounting standards (IAS/IFRS) developed by the International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB) as well as Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) developed by 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) started to require the adoption of the 
entity theory by 2005 and 2009, respectively. 
The financial literature helps to understand the reason why NCI arise in business. 
NCI can arise from two opposite types of corporate restructuring transactions, under 
which firms can maintain pyramid-ownership structures, whereby they control other firms 
through a chain of companies.  Namely, they can occur from a tender offer to acquire the 
target firm’s outstanding capital, or they can arise when a parent company sells a portion 
of its interests in a subsidiary in equity carve-out transactions (Beckman, 1995). These 
create two separate groups of shareholders, and several literature well documents that 
ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits at the 
cost of the NCI (e.g La Porta et al, 1997, 1998; Bozec and Laurin, 2008; Atanasov, Boone 
and Haushalter, 2010).  
Despite these previous accounting and financial literature, there is only a small 
number of empirical researches analysing the value relevance of the amount of NCI 
reported on consolidated financial statements and they provide mixed findings (e.g. Abad 
et al, So and Smith, 2009; Swanson, 2010). Value relevance is specified primarily in 
terms of explanatory power of summary accounting variables (book value of equity and 
earnings) and other information for security prices. Thus, the accounting numbers for NCI 
reported on consolidated financial statements can be understood as a proxy for the 
amount that parent shareholders have to share with other shareholders in their 
subsidiaries.  
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Abad et al (2000) rely their study on the identification of which consolidated 
accounts are more value relevant, those based on the entity theory or those based on 
parent company. One of the streams used in their study relies on the value relevance of 
the NCI components of net assets. Their sample comprises non-financial companies listed 
on the Madrid Stock Exchange, with and without NCI reported on financial statements 
from 1991 to 1997. At those dates the local standards in Spain required the presentation 
of NCI outside equity, between equity and liabilities, consistent with the parent company 
theory on consolidation. Their findings suggest some weak evidence in supporting the 
value relevance of reported NCI share of equity, with a positive association with share 
prices.  They justify that parent company shareholders are aware of this alternative form 
of financing for the net total assets over which they have control, but the authors do not 
justify why the association with share prices, although weak supported, is positive. 
So and Smith (2009) carry out their study on companies publicly listed on the Main 
Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), but just included those firms which 
reported NCI for 2004 to 2006. As in Spain, local standards in Hong Kong required that 
NCI were presented between liabilities and equity until 2005. Contrary to Abad et al 
(2000), So and Smith (2009) find a strong inverse relation of NCI with share prices until 
2005. These latter authors additionally find a total decline in the value relevance of NCI 
after 2005, period coincident with an entire change in the accounting regime of local 
standards to their adaptation to equivalent-for-word IAS/IFRS. Thus, it can be possible 
that this specific result is biased by a change in some of the institutional factors affecting 
accounting information and not just NCI. Still, the authors justify the inverse relation 
suggesting that investors view NCI as liabilities or as a source of external financing when 
they are presented outside equity, as if they have claim over it.  
Swanson (2010) also provides ambiguous results for the value relevance of NCI 
accounting numbers. He collected data from 1988 to 1994 for firms traded on NYSE or 
AMEX, with and without NCI reported. Within this date range US GAAP required the 
presentation of NCI between equity and liabilities in the consolidated financial 
statements.  He captures the potential well-sharing effects by the inclusion of the NCI 
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accounting numbers reported on consolidated statement of financial position. His findings 
appear to provide mixed empirical evidence on the association of NCI with share prices. 
He divided the entire sample in three blocks with equal number of firms according to firm 
size, and he found that in larger firms NCI are positively and significantly associated with 
share prices meanwhile in smaller and in the middle block NCI are negatively associated, 
although statistically significant just to those firms placed in the middle.    
These prior empirical studies on the value relevance of NCI reported on 
consolidated financial statements analyse three different countries. It can be possible that 
different market valuations of NCI are associated to differences in the institutional 
characteristics of the countries where firms operate. More precisely, in those countries 
based on common law, traditionally with a stronger level of investor protection, the 
relation between NCI and the parent company share prices probably is of different sign 
from those countries based on civil law, traditionally with a weaker level of investor 
protection.  
In theory, parent shareholders have the right to control the subsidiary, which, in 
turns, can have other shareholders with ability to participate and monitor that subsidiary, 
more precisely, the NCI. However, small non-controlling and non-strategic shareholders 
are assumed not to monitor, as each one has little power and no incentive to engage in 
monitoring (e.g. Kandel, Massa and Simonov, 2011), although actions from every 
shareholders, including the smaller ones, could affect the price of the stock (e.g., Hong, 
Kubik and Stein, 2004).  
But if NCI could behave as a larger shareholder for governance purposes, trying to 
maximize their own shareholder wealth, they could increase monitoring and demand 
timely and transparent information that is costly for parent shareholders, and will allow 
outside shareholders to exploit opportunities facing the firm (e.g Clacher et al, 2010). At 
the same time, the amount of NCI can be viewed as a proxy for the value of subsidiaries 
that must be attributable to NCI, which could contain other information linked to agency 
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costs and litigation costs (e.g. La Porta et al, 2006) between different shareholders in the 
same consolidated
8
.  
Thus, it could be expected that under stronger investor protection environments, 
parent companies are forced to shoulder the costs of control alone, but also forced to 
share the benefits of control with the minority shareholders. At the same time, minority 
shareholders are allowed to free ride at the controller’s expense (e.g Dammann, 2008). In 
fact, strengthening investor protection produces a significant wealth redistribution effect 
from controlling shareholders to outside shareholders (e.g. Albuquerque and Wang, 
2008). Some of the NCI rights may exercise influence on the parent firm’s management’s 
decisions if properly enforced and, probably will receive their part of benefits stemming 
from the corporate combination.  
These cases contrast with weaker investor protection environments, where private 
benefits of control are higher (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 2003). In these 
environments, controlling shareholders do not face such constrains imposed by investor 
protection, including corporate laws and their enforcement. The large shareholders of the 
parent company can act extracting private benefits from the firm they control at the 
expense of other non-controlling shareholders (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006). This may be seek by diverting firm resources for their own use, transferring 
assets of profits out of subsidiaries or committing funds to unprofitable projects that 
provide private benefits (e.g., Lin et al, 2011).  
Thus, a wealth-share effect suggests that the parent company’s ability to control has 
positive value if parent company managers can direct subsidiary activities to maximize 
                                                     
8
 Financial theory says that in countries with strong investor protection ownership tends to be less 
concentrated and there is propensity to exist agency conflict between managers and other shareholders (so-
called type I agency conflict, as, e.g., in Ali and Lesagne, 2011). Thus, certain groups or individuals can 
have monitoring effect on management, which, in turns, can be costly because will harm outside 
shareholders to exploit opportunities facing the firm (e.g Clacher et al, 2010). Moreover, under better 
protection NCI can increase costs to parent companies due to private litigation (La Porta et al, 2006) if 
necessary. By contrast, in countries with weaker investor protection ownership tends to be more 
concentrated and there is propensity to exist agency conflict between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders (so-called type II agency conflict), but recently works documents that nowadays this last type 
is predominant in a great number of European firms, even in those countries with stronger investor 
protection levels. 
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parent shareholder returns at non-controlling shareholders’ expense (e.g. Graham and 
Lefanowicz (1999)
9
. Recent studies find evidence that more developed stock markets, 
with stronger investor protection, favors minority shareholders, as reflected in the 
significant gains they earned around acquisition announcements in the case of majority 
shareholders wants to buy (e.g., Croci and Petnezas, 2010). By contrast, well established 
literature (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2000), is frequently 
used to justify that in legal systems with lower level of investor protection, large owners 
are less motivated to sell out and do not want to give up private benefits.  
Therefore, the portion of subsidiaries that is under parent company control but have 
to be attributable to NCI might have an effect on the wealth of parent shareholders as 
parent share prices respond to this information. Bearing this in mind, we posit that the 
relation between NCI and the market value of parent companies can be either negative or 
positive, depending upon how the market views this alternative source of finance equity: 
as additional partners with wealth share characteristics and ability to benefit parent 
company but with a higher costly effect, or with wealth expropriation possibilities at 
expenses of non-controlling shareholders.  
Based on prior literature, the likely of a negative association between NCI with the 
market value of parent company seems to be higher in common law countries. In these 
countries, the benefits on the wealth share arising from business combinations for both 
                                                     
9
 Graham and Lefanowicz (1999) say that controlling subsidiaries’ activities permits the majority owner the 
potential to capture minority interest value and this potential to capture control should be reflected as an 
increase in the value of the majority interest (premium) and a decrease in the value of the minority interest 
(discount). They provide evidence on whether majority and minority ownership interests are 
disproportionately priced. The authors conducted their study in a sample of publicly-traded parent and 
subsidiary pairs, traded on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ during the period of majority ownership, from 1983 
to 1992. In a first test, they find that parent companies have greater market to book multiples for their 
ownership interest in their subsidiaries than minority shareholders.  They justify that their findings can 
result from direct wealth transfers (direct expropriations) or from non-controlling shareholders discount. 
Accordingly, if market multiples are greater for parent shareholders that for both shareholders of diffusely-
held firms and minority shareholders, it will suggest that majority shareholders capture wealth from 
minorities. On the other hand, if parent and diffusely-held multiples are similarly sized, it will suggest that 
non-controlling shareholders discount the value of their shares relative to the value of the majority shares. 
To test, Graham and Lefanowicz (1999) checked their sample to ensure that neither single shareholder nor 
group of insiders owned more that 30 percent of each firm´s outstanding voting shares. The results 
confirmed a price discount hypothesis but not the wealth expropriation hypothesis, which is consistent of 
high protective investor’s laws. 
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groups of shareholders could not compensate the costs for the parent companies. By 
contrast, the likely of a positive association between NCI with the market value of parent 
company seems to be higher in civil law countries. In these countries, the benefits on the 
wealth share arising from business combinations are mainly attracted to parent 
shareholders, suggesting a positive reaction to obtain alternative sources of finance in 
environments where investors and creditors face the fears to be expropriated. It might also 
be said that some firms in countries with poor investor protection may have in exchange 
better firm-level governance to signal their good intentions to external investors, which, 
in turn, can increase corporate values in a way that compensate the potential costly effect 
of treat better their NCI (in the line of arguments found in Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Carlin and Mayer et al, 2003 and Hughes, 2009).  
A large number of studies also uses the legal origin of a country´s law as indicator 
of shareholder protection (e.g., Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 
2004; Boonlert-U-Thai, Mekk and Nabar, 2006; Hughes, 2009). Another number of 
studies use investor protection as a key institutional factor affecting corporate policy 
choices (e.g. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Ali and 
Hwang, 2000; Burgstahler and Dichev, 2006; Rahman, Yammeesri and Perera, 2010). In 
turns, there is also an extensive literature arguing that the relation between majority and 
minority shareholders is different accordingly to stronger or weaker levels of investor 
protection. Recent studies mention that currently the primary agency conflict is between 
large controlling shareholders and other investors (and not with management) due to, for 
example, the widespread use of pyramid ownership structures and cross-holdings among 
firms that belong to a business group (e.g., Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000; 
Claessens et al, 2002; Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Villalong 
and Amit, 2006; Bozec and Laurin, 2008; Lin et al, 2011).  
We contribute with an extended research with countries based on the same 
accounting system, but from different institutional environments. This can lead to a cross-
country comparison without suffer major differences on the enforcement of accounting 
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standards. Additionally, this can permit cross-country comparison, positing that legal 
origin can have an important role in the justification of the mixed results in previous 
empirical researches. 
 
3.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.3.1. Sample selection and data 
To develop our study, we select a set of European countries with different levels of 
investor protection. According to La Porta et al (1998), French-civil law countries have 
the weaker investor protection environment, and Common-law countries the stronger, 
with Scandinavian/German-civil law countries placed in the middle. We select countries 
from each of these three groups. We assure that to be included in the sample it needs to be 
available at least fifty observations in each year covered by our research. Thus, five 
European countries are selected, namely, United Kingdom (common law), Sweden and 
Germany (Scandinavian/German-civil law) and France and Greece (French-civil law). 
We use the following procedures to compose our sample. Banks and financial 
institutions are excluded from this research. Then, we include only those firms applying 
IAS/IFRS
10
 in the consolidated financial statements to avoid bias from mixed accounting 
measurements and different levels of financial accounting quality if applied another set of 
standards. We analyze those firms reporting NCI in their consolidated statement of 
financial position consecutively during the three years of our sample period (2008-2010). 
This procedure is taken to assure that firms have a frequently and continuous use of NCI 
disclosed in consolidated financial statements. The accounting and market data used in 
our analysis are collected from the Thompson Worlsdcope
©
 database. We exclude those 
                                                     
10
 Although Regulation 1606/2002 requires the mandatory adoption of IAS/IFRS in the preparation of 
consolidated financial statements for European firms listed in an European stock exchange, a great number 
of firms as disclosed in Worldscope Database uses other standards, namely, US GAAP. 
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firms with no data available at least in one year, as well as those firms with negative book 
value of equity.  Finally, to ensure that regression results are not influenced by outlying 
observations, the top and bottom one percent of each continuous variable distribution and 
also the observations with absolute studentized residual above 3 have been eliminated. 
Nevertheless, firms with NCI reported on the consolidated statement of financial 
position are a subset of the entire set of firms in each country, since there are a number of 
firms not reporting NCI in their financial statements, but as well applying IAS/IFRS. In 
order to compare our sample of firms with NCI with those firms without NCI, we used 
the same procedures as mentioned above and collected for the latest the same information 
from the Thompson Worlsdcope
©
 Database.  
Table 3.1 presents the sample distribution across country and industry. The first 
column shows the total number of firms applying IAS/IFRS in each country. The other 
columns present data for firm-years observations respectively with and without NCI 
reported on financial statements. Panel A presents the number of firm-years by country. It 
shows that our final sample of firms reporting NCI during 2008-2010 in consolidated 
financial statements consists of 2060 firm-years observations across the five countries. 
The greatest number of firm-years among the firms reporting NCI comes from France 
(671) followed by Germany (494), United Kingdom (475), Greece (261) and Sweden 
(159). Additionally, the set of firms without NCI reported during 2008-2010 in 
consolidated  financial  statements comprises 2790 firm-years observations across the five  
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TABLE 3.1 
Sample Description cross Countries and Industries 
    firm-years 
observations 
With NCI Without NCI 
 N N % N % 
 
Panel A: Country breakdown 
 
  United Kingdom 
  Germany 
  Sweden 
  France 
  Greece         
 
 
 
2,071 
845 
552 
932 
450 
4,850 
 
 
 
475 
494 
159 
671 
261 
2,060 
 
 
 
23% 
58% 
29% 
72% 
58% 
 
 
 
 
1,596 
351 
393 
261 
189 
2,790 
 
 
 
77% 
42% 
71% 
28% 
42% 
 
Panel B: Industry Breakdown 
 
  United Kingdom 
      Mining and Construction  
      Manufacturing/Industrials 
      Utilities  
      Wholesale/Retail trade  
      Services  
 
Germany 
      Mining and Construction  
      Manufacturing/Industrials 
      Utilities  
      Wholesale/Retail trade  
      Services 
 
 Sweden 
      Mining and Construction  
      Manufacturing/Industrials 
      Utilities  
      Wholesale/Retail trade  
      Services 
 
 France 
      Mining and Construction  
      Manufacturing/Industrials 
      Utilities  
      Wholesale/Retail trade  
      Services 
 
Greece 
      Mining and Construction  
      Manufacturing/Industrials 
      Utilities  
      Wholesale/Retail trade  
      Services 
 
 
 
 
353 
725 
170 
222 
601 
2,071 
 
33 
450 
82 
63 
217 
845 
 
48 
265 
32 
39 
168 
552 
 
45 
397 
82 
106 
302 
932 
 
55 
200 
60 
91 
44 
450 
 
 
 
83 
194 
47 
36 
115 
475 
 
30 
273 
52 
33 
106 
494 
 
6 
85 
11 
0 
57 
159 
 
42 
277 
76 
64 
212 
671 
 
43 
119 
30 
46 
23 
261 
 
 
 
17% 
41% 
10% 
8% 
24% 
100% 
 
6% 
55% 
11% 
7% 
21% 
100% 
 
4% 
52% 
7% 
0% 
35% 
100% 
 
6% 
41% 
11% 
10% 
32% 
100% 
 
16% 
46% 
11% 
18% 
9% 
100% 
 
 
 
270 
531 
123 
186 
486 
1,596 
 
3 
177 
30 
30 
111 
351 
 
42 
180 
21 
39 
111 
393 
 
3 
120 
6 
42 
90 
261 
 
12 
81 
30 
45 
21 
189 
 
 
 
17% 
33% 
8% 
12% 
30% 
100% 
 
1% 
50% 
9% 
9% 
32% 
100% 
 
11% 
46% 
5% 
10% 
28% 
100% 
 
1% 
46% 
2% 
16% 
34% 
100% 
 
6% 
43% 
16% 
24% 
11% 
100% 
 
(continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3.1 (Continued) 
Table 3.1 presents the sample description by country and industry breakdowns. 
 
The main sample of firms with NCI accounting numbers in consolidated statement of financial position consists of 471 
firm year observations for United Kingdom, 494 for Germany, 159 for Sweden, 671 for France and 261 for Greece for 
the fiscal years 2008 to 2010. To be included in our sample, firms in each country must have all the accounting and 
market variables with data available, non negative NCI and non negative equity. We require information for these three 
consecutive years and financial firms were excluded. We must have, also, at least 50 firm-year observations in each 
country.  
        
The sample of firms without NCI accounting numbers in consolidated statement of financial position consists of 1596 
firm  year  observations for  United  Kingdom, 351 for  Germany, 393 for  Sweden, 261 for  France and 189 for  Greece 
for the fiscal years 2008 to 2010. To be included in this table we require that none of the firms has been reporting NCI 
in consolidated financial statements for these three consecutive years and financial firms were excluded.   
         
The Industry breakdown is bases on one-digit SIC Codes, namely Mining and Construction (SIC 1000-1999); 
Manufacturing/Industrials (SIC 2000-3999); Utilities (SIC 4000-4999); Wholesale/Retail trade (SIC 5000-5999); 
Services (SIC 7000-9999). 
 
 
countries. The greatest number of firm-years among the firms without NCI in comes from 
United Kingdom (1596), followed by Sweden (393), Germany (351), France (261) and 
Greece (189). Panel B presents the sample distribution by industry. The Manufacturing is 
the most dominant industry in each set of firms (with and without NCI) in each country, 
followed by Services, except for Greece, in which the second most dominant Industry is 
wholesale and retail trade. 
The results of the tests of equality of proportions of firm-year observations with and 
without NCI in the consolidated statement of financial position (untabulated) were 
rejected, suggesting that there is evidence of statistically significant differences in each 
country. Furthermore, when comparing our five European countries we observe that 
United Kingdom is the country with a lower proportion of firms reporting NCI (23%), 
followed by Sweden (29%), Germany (58%), Greece (58%) and France (72%). This 
findings are consistent with Lopes and Lourenço (2011)
11
 whose univariate analysis and 
logistics regression indicated that the proportion of firms and the estimated probability of 
reporting NCI were lower in Common-law countries when compared to the proportion 
and probability of reporting NCI in Scandinavian/German-civil-law countries, which in 
                                                     
11
 This paper is the one presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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turn were significantly lower than in French-civil-law countries. They support their 
findings on the agency conflict between the controlling and non-controlling shareholders, 
putting in evidence that the use of NCI is more preeminent in countries whose 
characteristics provide more probability of extract private benefits at the expense of non-
controlling shareholders, by freezing out minority shareholders, by engaging in related-
party transactions and through managerial entrenchment (e.g. Ali et al., 2007). 
 
3.3.2. Research method 
We aim to examine whether the market values Non-Controlling Interests (NCI) in a 
different way depending on the institutional environment of the parent company. We 
analyze a set of firms from five European countries whose legal origin provides different 
levels of investor protection. 
Although prior literature reveals some cautions with value relevance studies (e.g., 
Holthausen and Watts, 2001), Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001) argue that value-
relevance research anchors on the use of widely accepted valuation models and it 
provides a helpful assessment of how well accounting figures reflect information used by 
equity investors when they have to take economic decisions. Capital market-based 
accounting research, as well as value relevance empirical studies, originated firstly with 
the work of Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968). The more recent value relevance 
research relies on the idea that there is a relationship between market value of equity and 
accounting information. Thus, despite the fact that these valuations models must not 
accurately portray all aspects of real firms, it is an established, parsimonious, and well-
accepted valuation theory that is the basis for much extant empirical accounting capital 
markets research (Barth and Clinch, 2009).  
Following the widespread research on value relevance, the empirical model 
employed in this study relies on a general equity valuation model, which expresses the 
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market value of equity as a function of the book value of equity and net income, 
 
given by 
Equation (1), 
  
MV         V     NI          (1) 
where MV is the market value of equity at the fiscal year end
12
, BV and NI are 
respectively the book value of equity attributable to parent shareholders and net income, 
and  is value-relevant information not yet reflected in BV and NI. In order to mitigate 
scale effect problems, all the variables are deflated by the number of shares outstanding, 
resulting in a per share basis.  
Prior literature provides evidence that the market valuation of net income is rather 
different for cases with negative amounts (e.g., Rees, 1999). The rational is that the 
market expects profits to persist, meanwhile losses are not expected to persist in the 
future (e.g., Hayn, 1995; Chang, Herbohn and Tutticci, 2009). Since shareholders can 
liquidate a firm rather than suffer from persistent losses, investors perceive losses as 
temporary (Hayn, 1995). Therefore, we use a new estimating equation, Equation (2), 
which allows the relation between the market value of equity and net income to vary 
according to whether net income is positive or negative and is given by 
 
                                           (2) 
 
where LOSS is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for firms with negative NI and 0 
otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction term NI x LOSS reflects how the market’s 
valuation of losses differs from its valuation of profits. To the extent losses are more 
weakly associated with firm market value than profits, we expect that 03  . 
                                                     
12
 Not tabulated findings reveal that our results are not sensitive to use the market value three months after 
fiscal year-end.  
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Findings from the scant literature on the value relevance of NCI provides some 
empirical ambiguous evidence that they have significant explanatory power for stock 
prices over the traditional summary accounting measures such as book value of equity 
and net income (e.g. Abad et al, 2000; So and Smith, 2009; Swanson, 2010). Given that 
our focus also is on the market valuation of NCI, we use a new regression equation, 
Equation (3), which comprises the variable NCI. This variable is defined as the amount of 
equity in a subsidiary not attributable, directly or indirectly, to a parent and it represents 
the amount displayed in the consolidated financial position of the parent company at 
fiscal year end. Our equation turns to, 
 
                                                    (3) 
 
Would NCI have value relevance, the coefficient on NCI, α4, would be statistical 
significant and different from zero. If NCI impacts positively on share prices, the 
coefficient on NCI, α4, will be positive. By contrast, if NCI has a negative relation with 
share prices, the coefficient on NCI, α4, will be negative. 
Given that our sample includes only those firms reporting NCI in consolidated 
statement of financial position, a potential self selection bias may be introduced when 
analyzing the value relevance of NCI. To control for the effects of self-selection bias, we 
implement the Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage we use 
a binary logistic model which identifies the determinants of choice of using NCI. The 
estimated value in this binary logistic model is then used to generate the Inverse of Mill’s 
ratio for each observation. In the second stage, we use this estimation as an additional 
explanatory variable in our linear regression model stated in Equation (3), for which 
parameters will be estimated by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. 
The dependent variable used in the binary logistic regression is a binary variable 
which assumes 1 for firms reporting NCI in their consolidated statement of financial 
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position. Following prior studies (e.g. Lopes and Lourenço, 2011
13
), we predict that 
incentives for using NCI as a source of finance include profitability, leverage, size and 
industry membership. More specifically, we estimate the following logit model: 
 
                                         ∑             (4) 
 
where NCI_FIN is a binary variable which assumes 1 for firms reporting NCI 
every year during the entire sample period and 0 for firms who have never reported NCI 
during the entire sample period, ROE is the firm’s return on equity, LEV is the firm’s 
leverage measured as total liabilities divided by total assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of market capitalization and IND are indicator variables based on one-digit SIC codes. In 
addition, since the amount of NCI can vary across years, we run the logistic regression 
with year fixed effects.  
This binary logistic regression, Equation (4), is estimated on a country-specific 
analysis based on 2071 firm-year observations from United Kingdom, 552 from Sweden, 
845 from Germany, 932 from France and 450 from Greece, representing the total number 
of firms applying IAS/IFRS, with and without NCI reported on consolidated financial 
statements (see table 3.1). 
As stated, the Equation (4) will permit to construct the Inverse of Mill’s ratio, 
which in turns is included in Equation (3) as a variable with the function of control for 
selection bias. Furthermore, Equation (3) should include other controls for factors that 
previous research identifies as associated with firm´s market value, namely, profitability, 
leverage and firm size. We do not include those control variables because they are already 
incorporated in the estimation of the Inverse of Mill´s ratio, but we include AUD and 
XLIST, which are often used in prior literature to control for law enforcement and for 
financing growth opportunities, respectively. More precisely, the auditor´s role in 
                                                     
13
 From this point ahead until the end of chapter 3, the reference of Lopes and Lourenço (2011) is coincided 
with the paper in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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different countries can be distinct, in the sense that auditors can be used as a sign of better 
law enforcement with ability to reduce information asymmetry (e.g. Khalil, Magnan and 
Cohen, 2008; Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008). By other hand, the cross-listing in other 
stock exchanges is frequently taken by firms domiciled in countries with poor investor 
protection, as a sign of better commitment to protect their investors with ability to face 
the constrains on financing growth opportunities externally (e.g., see Reese and Weisbach 
(2002) and O´Connor (2006)). We incorporate AUD and XLIST as binary variables 
assuming 1 for firms audited by a Big 4 audit firm and for firms listed in more than one 
stock exchange, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
The Equation (4) is estimated at a country level, with industry and year fixed 
effects.  We run this equation separately for each one of the five countries, and just 
include firms that has been reported NCI for three consecutive years from 2008 to 2010, 
comprising 475 firm-year observations from United Kingdom, 159 from Sweden, 494 
from Germany, 671 from France and 261 from Greece (see table 3.1). This equation is 
helpful to the research question, since it assess whether NCI help explain the variation of 
market values in addition of the effects of book value and net income.   
Discussion of results of OLS estimates for Equation (3), including control variables, 
allows us to identify whether the sign of the coefficient on the variable NCI, α4, differ 
across countries with different level of investor protection. Based on investor protection 
differences related to legal origin, we expect opposite signs of α4 between France/Greece 
(French-civil law) and United Kingdom (Common law). We do not make predictions 
about Sweden and Germany (Scandinavian/German-civil law). 
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3.4. RESULTS 
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of firms with NCI, for 
which we apply our value relevance OLS regression based on Equation (3). Panel A 
shows data for the common law country (United Kingdom), meanwhile Panel B and C 
presents data for Scandinavian/German law (Germany and Sweden) and French-civil law 
countries (France and Greece), respectively.  
A simple observation of table 3.2 reveals that the mean and the median of the 
market value per share (MV) are substantial higher than the book value (BV) in all 
countries except on Greece. There are differences in the mean values comparing all the 
variables between countries and the median is lower than the media for the generality of 
the continuous variables in each country, except for the variable NCI in Sweden and the 
variables BV and NI in Greece, in which their median is higher than their media. These 
differences appear to justify the use of post hoc tests in the analysis of variance to provide 
specific information on which means are significantly different from each other.  
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TABLE 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics for variables used in analyses – OLS Regression 
 
Mean Median 
Stand. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
 
Panel A: Common-Law Countries 
 
United Kingdom (N= 475) 
MV 4.654 2.500 5.796 0.034 35.209 
BV 2.296 1.540 2.202 0.011 15.924 
NI 0.320 0.186 0.436 -0.411 2.870 
NCI 0.075 0.018 0.143 >0.000 1.021 
LOSS 0.18     
AUD 0.81     
XLIST 0.09     
 
Panel B: Scandinavian/German civil-law countries 
 
Sweden (N=159) 
MV 59.847 54.500 41.618 1.490 169.700 
BV 31.323 25.303 23.259 1.034 107.661 
NI 3.614 3.321 4.052 -7.259 15.625 
NCI 0.313 1.408 0.406 0.001 2.463 
LOSS 0.16     
AUD 0.96     
XLIST 0.12     
      
Germany (N=496)      
MV 21.765 14.540 21.861 0.700 158.938 
BV 14.664 10.883 14.642 1.006 124.313 
NI 1.304 0.707 2.209 -6.438 14.693 
NCI 0.544 0.151 0.973 >0.000 5.877 
LOSS 0.17     
AUD 0.68     
XLIST 0.56     
      
Panel C: French civil-law countries 
 
France (N=671) 
MV 29.787 21.154 28.572 0.600 203.482 
BV 24.377 16.981 24.808 0.769 174.641 
NI 2.179 1.543 3.441 -10.617 21.743 
NCI 1.346 1.1929 4.347 >0.000 66.325 
LOSS 0.16     
AUD 0.69     
XLIST 0.14     
 
Greece (N=261) 
     
MV 1.921 1.760 2.099 0.140 11.9 
BV 2.775 3.399 2.049 0.214 14.192 
NI 0.006 0.097 0.370 -1.168 1.676 
NCI 0.304 0.279 0.530 >0.000 3.010 
LOSS 0.45     
AUD 0.26     
XLIST 0.08     
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3.2 (Continued) 
Table 3.2 provides the descriptive for the variables used in Equation (4) estimated using OLS regression estimation. All 
the monetary values are presented in Euros currency. 
 
Sample: The variables are computed from 475 firm year observations for United Kingdom, 494 for Germany, 159 for 
Sweden, 671 for France and 261 for Greece for the fiscal years 2008 to 2010.  
Variables definition: MV is market value of equity per share at the fiscal year end. BV is book value of equity per share 
attributable to parent shareholders. NI is net income per share attributable to parent shareholders. LOSS is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with negative NI and 0 otherwise. NCI is the portion of equity in subsidiaries 
per share not attributable to the parent. AUD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the parent company is 
audited by a Big 4, and 0 otherwise. XLIST is a indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is quoted in more 
than one stock exchange and 0 otherwise. 
 
The mean values for the variables LOSS, AUD and XLIST represent the percentage of firms reporting losses, the 
percentage of firms audited by a BIG 4 audit firm and the percentage of firms listed in more than one stock exchange 
respectively.  
 
 
Untabulated results for ANOVA reveals that we reject the null of the equality of the 
means between the five countries for each one of the variables (p<0.000) meaning that at 
least two means are different. With the post hoc test we identify that the differences of the 
means for MV, BV and NI are statistical significant for each pair-wise country 
comparison except between United Kingdom versus Greece. Furthermore, we identify 
that the difference of the means for NCI is statistical significant between France versus 
United Kingdom (p=0.000), versus Sweden (p=0.000), versus Germany (p=0.000) and 
versus Greece (p=0.000), as well as between United Kingdom versus Germany (p=0.033). 
In all the other possible pair-wise country comparisons the difference of the means on the 
NCI variable are not statistically significant (p>0.10). 
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample of firms for which we 
apply our binary logistic regression estimate to Equation (4). This table compares the 
characteristics of firms reporting NCI every year during the entire sample period with 
those who have never reported NCI during the same period. We find that in each country 
those firms with NCI are significantly larger (SIZE), more leveraged (LEV) and more 
profitable (ROE) when compared to firms without NCI
14
.  
                                                     
14
 The ROE in Greece was the only one whose mean difference between firms with and without NCI, does 
not present statistical significance.  
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The results for the equality of means parametric t-test for independent samples 
confirm that the mean values are statistically different, consistent with prior literature on 
the characteristics of firms reporting NCI in consolidated financial statements (e.g. 
Lopes and Lourenço, 2011). 
Table 3.4 reveals correlations for the continuous variables included in the OLS 
regression. Panels A, B and C present the correlation matrix for each country classified 
by legal origin.  
 
TABLE 3.4 
Correlation matrix between continuous variables in the OLS Regression 
Panel A: Common law countries         
  United Kingdom       
  MV BV NI NCI       
MV 1 0.733** 0.857** 0.276**       
BV 0.817** 1 0.676** 0.450**       
NI 0.805** 0.695** 1 0.266**       
NCI 0.421** 0.428** 0.326** 1       
                
    
Panel B: Scandinavian/German-civil law countries       
  Sweden   Germany 
  MV BV NI NCI   MV BV NI NCI 
MV 1 0.607** 0.633** 0.124   1 0.824** 0.654** 0.404** 
BV 0.695** 1 0.397** 0.375**   0.860** 1 0.549** 0.517** 
NI 0.668** 0.522** 1 0.143   0.691** 0.627** 1 0.320** 
NCI 0.221** 0.403** 0.213** 1   0.435** 0.484** 0.314** 1 
                    
Panel C: French-civil law countries           
  France   Greece 
  MV BV NI NCI   MV BV NI NCI 
MV 1 0.699** 0.764** 0.288**   1 0.474** 0.597** 0.348** 
BV 0.798** 1 0.673** 0.278**   0.599** 1 0.197** 0.466** 
NI 0.792** 0.679** 1 0.195**   0.574** 0.215** 1 0.046 
NCI 0.349** 0.418** 0.267** 1   0.329** 0.410** 0.062 1 
              
  
 (Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 3.4 (Continued) 
Table 3.4 presents Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal for the variables on Equation (4) 
estimated using a OLS Regression. 
**.  In these table means that correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*.    In these table means that correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Sample: The main sample of firms with NCI accounting numbers in consolidated statement of financial position 
consists of 475 firm year observations for United Kingdom, 494 for Germany, 159 for Sweden, 671 for France and 
261 for Greece for the fiscal years 2008 to 2010. 
 
Variables definition: MV is market value of equity per share at the fiscal year end. BV is book value of equity per 
share attributable to parent shareholders. NI is net income per share attributable to parent shareholders. NCI is the 
portion of equity in subsidiaries per share not attributable to the parent.  
 
Consistent with conventional results in the accounting literature, the market value 
of equity is positively and statistically related to book value and earnings. It is also 
positively related with NCI but with lower pairwise correlations coefficients. In each 
country, the independent variables included in the regressions, whilst reveals some 
indications of collinearity in the majority of the cases, have no pairwise correlations 
coefficients in excess of 0.80, a rule of thumb suggesting that multicollinearity is not a 
serious problem (e.g. Gurajati, 2008). Even though, the problem can still exist for lower 
correlations values. Thus, tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF) are measured as 
part of the value relevance OLS regression model to detect multicollinearity (e.g 
Gujarati, 2008). 
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3.4.2. Regression results and discussion 
Following the Heckman´s procedure to control for self selection bias
15
, we firstly 
run the binary logistic regression (Equation 3). The results, presented in Table 3.5., 
indicate that in all the five countries there is a positive association between the variables 
ROE, SIZE and LEV and the choice of use NCI as an alternative source of finance, but 
just statistically significant for LEV and SIZE.    
The estimated value from the binary logistic is used to generate the Inverse of 
Mill’s ratio for each observation, added in the second stage as a new explanatory 
variable in our value relevance OLS regression for Equation (3). Table 3.6 reports the 
results for each one of the countries including all the covariates, corrected for self 
selection and for heteroskedasticity (White test)
16
.  
 
 
 TABLE 3.5 
Determinants for the use of NCI - Binary Logistic regression results 
 
    Common law country   Scandinavian/German civil-law countries   French civil-law countries 
    United Kingdom   Sweden   Germany    France   Greece 
   coef.   coef.   coef.   coef.   coef. 
ROE   0.320     0.347     0.561     0.677     0.276   
SIZE   0.480 ***   0.598 ***   0.455 ***   0.540 ***   0.354 *** 
LEV   3.203 ***   2.000 ***   1.943 ***   3.624 ***   4.323 *** 
                                
Nagelkerke R2   0.370     0.453     0.276     0.334     0.242   
N   2,081     553     856     946     454   
(Continued on next page) 
 
  
                                                     
15
 This is because we want that our value relevance OLS estimation of Equation (4) includes controls for 
self selection bias. It can be expected that firms do not choose randomly when they should have or should 
not have NCI reported in consolidated financial statements, but rather on the basis on the firm´s 
characteristics and comparative advantages of alternative sources of finance.  
16
 Untabulated results show that our estimates maintains qualitatively unchanged if we have dropped 
Inverse Mills from the Equation although a lower adjusted R
2
. 
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TABLE 3.5 (Continued) 
Table 3.5 reveals the results for Equation (5) estimated using a binary logistic regression. . Industry and year fixed 
effects included. 
 
Sample: This estimation was run for a sample of 2,081 firm year-observations for United Kingdom (485 with NCI 
and 1,596 without NCI), 856 for Germany (505 with NCI and 351 without NCI), 553 for Sweden (160 with NCI and 
393 without NCI), 946 for France (685 with NCI and 261 without NCI) and 454 for Greece (265 with NCI and 189 
without NCI) for the fiscal years 2008 to 2010.  
 
Variables definition: The dependent variable is NCI_FIN, a binary variable which assumes 1 for firms reporting NCI 
every year during the entire sample period and 0 for firms who never reported NCI during the entire sample period. 
The covariates are: ROE is Return on Equity, calculated as the net income attributable to common shareholders 
divided by the parent shareholders´ common equity, LEV is leverage measured by total liabilities divided by total 
assets and SIZE is a measure of firm size, being the natural logarithm of market capitalization 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
The empirical results highlight the value relevance of summary accounting 
measures, as well as other information, namely, the amount of NCI reported on the 
consolidated statement of financial position. The coefficients estimates for the variables 
BV is positive and statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) in each one of the countries 
for the sample period covered by our analysis, and they are consistent with prior value 
relevance studies. The coefficients estimates for the variable NI are also statistically 
positive (p<0.01), while the coefficient estimate for the interaction term of NI with the 
binary variable LOSS is significantly negative (p<0.01) for all the countries. These 
results for losses are consistent with economic intuition (e.g. Bauman, 2003), and are 
evidence that the market valuation of losses differs from its valuation of profits. 
Investors perceive them as temporary and, thus, they are more weakly associated with 
firm value than profits (as the sum of the coefficients of the variables NI with LOSSxNI 
is near zero, except in United Kingdom).    
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TABLE 3.6 
Value relevance of NCI by country – OLS  regression results 
 
  
Common law 
country   
Scandinavian/Germa- civil law 
countries   French civil-law countries 
  United Kingdom   Sweden   Germany   France   Greece 
  coef   coef   coef   coef   coef 
Intercept -1.449 ***   -18.185 ***   -12.900     -27.109 ***   -0.586   
BV 0.664 ***   0.501 ***   0.884 ***   0.261 ***   0.206 *** 
NI 8.674 ***   4.881 ***   3.276 ***   5.341 ***   4.960 *** 
LOSSxNI -13.594 ***   -4.992 **   -2.320 **   -5.326 ***   -4.075 *** 
NCI -3.141 ***   -9.444 **   -1.683 **   0.450 ***   0.430 ** 
AUD -0.676 ***   -2.696     0.059     2.204 **   0.379 * 
XLIST 0.241     -2.127     -0.169     1.889     -0.644 * 
Inv_Mills 3.644 ***   44.368 ***   20.866 ***   35.123 ***   2.361 *** 
                              
Adjusted R2 0.827   0.753   0.791   0.744   0.665 
F-test 175.459***   41.242***   144.564***   150.463***   40.762*** 
 
Table 3.6 reveals the results for Equation (4) estimated using a OLS Regression corrected for self-selection and for 
heteroskedasticity. Industry and year fixed effects included in both. 
 
Sample: The main sample of firms with NCI accounting numbers in consolidated statement of financial position 
consists of 475 firm year observations for United Kingdom, 494 for Germany, 159 for Sweden, 671 for France and 
261 for Greece for the fiscal years 2008 to 2010.  
 
Variables definition: The dependent variable is MV, the market value of equity per share at the fiscal year end. The 
independent variables are: BV is book value of equity per share attributable to parent shareholders. NI is net income 
per share attributable to parent shareholders. LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with 
negative NI and 0 otherwise. NCI is the portion of equity in subsidiaries per share not attributable to the parent. SIZE 
is a measure of firm size, being the natural logarithm of market capitalization. AUD is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the parent company is audited by a Big 4 and 0 otherwise. XLIST is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of 1 if the firm is quoted in more than one stock exchange and 0 otherwise. Inv_Mills is the Inverse of 
Mill’s ratio computed with the binary logistic model in the first stage, consistent with Heckman (1979) procedure.  
 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
In order to achieve the main objective of this empirical study, our analysis relies 
on the coefficient estimates for the variable NCI. The results show that in all the 
countries the variable NCI has explanatory power for share prices, since all the 
coefficients α4 are statistically different from zero. More precisely, in United Kingdom, 
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NCI is statistically negative (coef. = -3,141; p-value < 0.01), suggesting an inverse 
relation with share prices. Similar results are found for Germany (coef. = -1.683; p-
value < 0.01) and Sweden (coef. = -9.444; p-value < 0.05). By contrast, NCI is 
statistically positive in France (coef. = 0.450; p-value < 0.01) and in Greece (coef. = 
0.430; p-value < 0.05), suggesting a positive relation with share prices.  
All the coefficients presented in Table 3.6 are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Even so, because the correlation analysis provided some caution to collinearity, we 
estimate tolerance and VIF, as well as Durbin-Watson statistics, as part of our OLS 
regression estimations presented in this table. All the variables are at conventional 
levels, suggesting that there are no apparent multicollinearity or autocorrelation 
problems affecting our results. 
Our findings for the United Kingdom suggest that the amount of NCI reported 
has a negative association with share prices. These findings are consistent with the 
expectation that in common law countries, with a stronger level of investor protection, 
parent companies bear the costs of control alone but are forced to share the benefits of 
business combination with the NCI. The probable wealth redistribution effect from 
controlling shareholders to NCI, the ability of NCI to demand monitoring, timely and 
quality accounting information and the allowance to free ride at expenses of controlling 
shareholders can be so costly to parent companies that the market discount that value. 
Thus, it seems that the potential benefits of synergies and additional capital provided by 
other shareholders could not be compensated with the potential costs of control, and the 
market reacts negatively to NCI in common law countries. Thus, our results corroborate 
the findings in Lopes and Lourenço (2011) and can justify the reason why a smaller 
number of firms in United Kingdom use NCI as an alternative source of finance equity 
and why that the majority of subsidiaries are wholly owned by parent companies.   
By contrast, our findings suggest that the amount of NCI has a positive 
association with share prices in France and Greece. These findings are also consistent 
with expectations, since in those countries based on civil law, traditionally with a 
weaker level of investor protection, the large shareholders can behave toward their 
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private benefits at expenses of non-controlling interests, who, in turns, generally do not 
have the power to constrain that ability. Thus, it seems that the parent company’s ability 
to control has positive value, even if the firm engage voluntary in actions to show to the 
market that NCI are well treated, and the markets reacts positively to NCI in French-
civil law countries. These findings also support the ones in Lopes and Lourenço (2011) 
and can justify the reason why a greater number of firms in France and Greece use NCI 
as an alternative source of finance equity and why that the majority of subsidiaries are 
partially owned by parent companies.   
Our findings about the value relevance of NCI for Germany and Sweden are 
similar to those of the United Kingdom, ie, in both cases there is a negative association 
between NCI and the parent company’s share prices. However, prior literature 
document that Germany and Sweden, although having a higher level of investor 
protection than French-civil law countries, present a lower level as compared to 
Common law countries (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998). Thus, we develop further analysis in 
order to find whether the market penalization of NCI is different for firms from 
Germany and Sweden, when compared to firms from the United Kingdom.   
We develop a firm-level analysis including the firms from these three countries all 
together. We use a new estimating equation which allows the coefficient of the variable 
NCI to vary according country origin. Thus, we add to Equation (3) an indicator 
variable, SGL, which assumes 1 for firms from Sweden and Germany and 0 for firms 
from the United Kingdom, as well as the interaction term of SGL with NCI. If the 
market penalization of firms from Germany and Sweden is statistically lower/higher, 
when compared to the United Kingdom, then the coefficient of SGLxNCI would be 
positive/negative and statistically significant. 
Table 3.7 presents the results of this additional analysis. The coefficient estimate 
for the variable NCI remains negative and statistically significant (-6.480, p<0.01). By 
contrast, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term of NCI with SGL is positive 
and statistically significant (3.213, p<0.01), which means that the market penalization of 
NCI for Swedish and German firms is lower when compared to the United Kingdom. 
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TABLE 3.7 
Value Relevance of NCI by legal origin - OLS  regression results 
 
  
 
Common Law vs 
Scandinavian/German 
civil law   
Intercept -9.286 ***   
BV 0.822 ***   
NI 5.688 ***   
LOSSxNI -6.999 ***   
NCI -6.480 ***   
SGL 3.427 ***   
SGLxNCI 3.213 ***   
        
N 1,128  
Adjusted 
R2 0.808 
F-test 317.529*** 
 
Table 3.7 reveals the results for extending Equation (4) to include interactions of NCI with Scandinavian/German 
(SGL) legal origins. The results are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, with industry and year fixed 
effects.  
 
Sample: Includes all the firms with NCI accounting numbers in consolidated statement of financial position in United 
Kingdom, Sweden and Germany, comprising 1,128 firm year observations.  
 
Variables definition: The dependent variable is MV, the market value of equity per share at the fiscal year end. The 
independent variables are: MV is market value of equity per share at the fiscal year end. BV is book value of equity 
per share attributable to parent shareholders. NI is net income per share attributable to parent shareholders. LOSS is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with negative NI and 0 otherwise. NCI is the portion of equity in 
subsidiaries per share not attributable to the parent. SGL is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
year belongs to German or Sweden and 0 otherwise. The estimation also includes other control variables, not 
tabulated for easier presentation. AUD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the parent company is 
audited by a Big 4 and 0 otherwise. XLIST is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is quoted in 
more than one stock exchange and 0 otherwise. Inv_Mills is the Inverse of Mill’s ratio computed with the binary 
logistic model in the first stage, consistent with Heckman (1979) procedure. Results maintain qualitatively unchanged 
if controls for firm size, profitability and leverage are included. 
 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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This last result allows us to have more robust conclusions on the way as the 
market views NCI. Accordingly, the market seems to penalize firms reporting NCI in 
stronger level of investor protection countries and seems to benefit those in weakest 
level investor protection countries, with firms located in a Scandinavian/German-civil-
law countries placed in the middle.  This evidence is consistent with prior literature 
confirming that Scandinavian/German-civil law countries are in between Common law 
and French-civil law countries and offer intermediate levels of investor protection (e.g., 
La Porta et al, 1998, 2000).  
Taken together, our results extend prior literature on the value relevance of NCI.  
A positive association of NCI and share prices was documented by Abad et al (2000) 
for Spanish firms, meanwhile negative association were found in So and Smith (2009) 
and Swanson (2010) for firms from Hong Kong and United States, respectively. These 
three countries are associated to different legal origins, namely, French-civil law (the 
first) and Common law (the last two). Moreover, previous studies range from including 
all the listed firms in the specific country (Abad et al, 2000; Swanson, 2010), or only 
those firms with NCI reported on consolidated financial statements (So and Smith, 
2009). Our study departs from prior literature in several ways. We are the first to control 
for self selection derived from the firms’ choice to use NCI as an alternative source of 
finance equity. Additionally, we include firms from different countries applying similar 
accounting rules, since all of them use IAS/IFRS in their consolidated financial 
statements. Finally, we analyze the effect of investor protection on the market valuation 
of NCI. Our results seem to confirm that the market values NCI in a different way 
depending on the institutional environment of the parent company. More precisely, legal 
origin, as a proxy for its intrinsic level of investor protection, can play a role in explain 
the relation between NCI and the market value of the shares of parent companies.  
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3.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates whether the market values NCI in a different way 
depending on the institutional environment of the parent company. We analyze a set of 
firms from five European countries with different legal origins and, consequently, 
different levels of investor protection, namely, United Kingdom (common law), German 
and Sweden (Scandinavian/German-civil law) and France and Greece (French-civil 
law). We examine whether the association between NCI and the market value of parent 
company´ shares is different across these three groups of countries. For each country, 
we analyze firms applying IAS/IFRS that reporting NCI in their statement of financial 
position. We use a market based valuation model that links the market value of parent 
companies’ shares with accounting data and other information, analyzing the slope and 
the sign of the variable NCI.  
The empirical evidence suggests a positive association between NCI and the 
parent company’s share prices occurring in France and Greece, as opposed to a negative 
association in the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden. Additionally, we find that 
the market penalization of NCI for Swedish and German firms is lower when compared 
to the United Kingdom. These evidences are based on countries whose legal origin 
differs among them, and our results are consistent with prior findings separating civil 
law origins and placing Scandinavian/German-civil law origin in the middle of French-
civil law and Common law (e.g., La Porta et al, 1998, 2000). 
 Overall, our results provide robust evidence that legal origin plays a role on the 
relation between NCI and the market value of parent companies. Given that legal origin 
is linked to the level of investor protection, our research provides evidence that the 
lower the investor protection environment, the more likelihood of a non-negative 
association between NCI and share prices. 
On institutional environments with stronger protection to investors, parent 
companies have to wealth share benefits with NCI but they are costly, and the market 
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discounts that value, since investors react harmfully when they have to share financial 
assets. Thus, in United Kingdom, Sweden and Germany, the relation between NCI with 
share prices of parent companies is negative, in spite of a higher penalization for firms 
from the United Kingdom. This evidence can probably justify the reason why there are 
a lower percentage of parent companies with subsidiaries partially owned in the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and Germany, when compared to France and Greece.  
By contrast, as the level of protection is weaker, more opportunity to extract 
private benefits of control at expenses of NCI arises. If the market values positively that 
ability, a positive relation of NCI with the market value of parent companies’ shares 
occurs. The NCI contributes with additional capital that can be useful to parent 
companies without the monitoring and other constrains imposed by higher levels of 
investor protection. This evidence can probably justify the reason why there are a higher 
percentage of parent companies with subsidiaries partially owned in France and Greece 
than in other countries with stronger investor protection.  
Our findings contribute to the literature that focuses in attributes of information 
provided by financial accounting within or across different countries, whose 
institutional characteristics offer different levels of investor protection. More precisely, 
we help to explain the diversity of the scant literature on the value relevance of NCI, 
which can be useful to investors, other users of financial statements and even to 
standard setters, since our results seems not to be influenced by diversity on the 
accounting for NCI. As far as we know, this should be the one of the first studies to 
explore cross-country differences using legal origin to draw conclusions about the 
relation between NCI reported on the consolidated statement of financial position and 
the market value of parent companies. It should nevertheless be inferred carefully 
because there can be other omitted variables and because we do not include all the 
European countries due to lack of information.  However, our evidence is robust to the 
inclusion of controls for firms characteristic and for the potential effect of self-selection 
bias.   
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates whether the market prices non-controlling interests 
(NCI) by the same way irrespectively of their location in the consolidated statement of 
financial position.  We use a cross-sectional valuation model to test whether the current 
method of reporting NCI (as equity) has a differential effect on share prices, relative to 
the previous method of reporting (as non-equity), testing the consistency of market 
investor’s perception on accounting numbers presented under different financial 
statements’ formats. 
Our sample includes publicly traded German firms that were early adopters of 
IAS/IFRS in 2002, in a total of six years, assuring that data provides evidence in both 
periods in which NCI is reported as non-equity and as equity. Additionally, we divide 
the sample by firm characteristics like the weight of NCI, the firm size and the leverage. 
Our results suggest that NCI are priced by the market in the same manner irrespectively 
of being included as equity or non-equity. Our study extends prior literature on the 
debate surrounding alternative manners of report accounting information in financial 
statements and on the relevance of NCI.  
 
Key words: Non-controlling interests, recognition vs disclosure, consolidated statement 
of financial position, changes to standards. 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 This paper investigates whether the market prices non-controlling interests 
(NCI) by the same way irrespectively of their location in the consolidated statement of 
financial position. NCI has been for so long reported as a mezzanine item between 
liability and equity, while currently it should be presented within equity. In the USA 
and in Europe these changes were required by the new rules on consolidation prepared 
in the scope of the second phase of the joint project on business combination, namely 
the SFAS 160, Noncontrolling Interests and Consolidated Financial statements (issued 
2007, effective 2008) and the IAS 27, Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements 
(revised 2003, effective 2005)
18
. 
Charles Mulford, director of the Georgia Tech Financial Analysis Lab, looked at 
the likely effect of implementing SFAS 160 on the reporting of NCI and found 
significant increases in shareholders’ equity and interest coverage ratio, as well as some 
decreases in liabilities to shareholders’ equity ratio (Mulford and Quinn, 2008). 
Investors must therefore be aware of changes on financial ratios derived only from 
differences in accounting procedures despite of a lack of any actual changes in their 
underlying economic profile (Urbancic, 2008; Henry et al., 2008).  Henry et al (2008) 
and Deitrick (2010) recall that this awareness is extensible to analysts in the 
computation of financial ratios.  
 However, the Standard and Poor’s already have been including NCI within equity 
in the computation of debt to debt plus equity ratios even before the accounting 
standards require such procedure (corporate ratings criteria: 2006, 2008). Actually, 
                                                     
18
 The non-controlling interests are the new name for minority interests, chosen by both Boards under the 
Business Combinations Project, due to the fact that better defines the nature of these element of financial 
statements (changed in 2008 IAS 27 revision). Also, as stated in previous chapters, IASB has issued in 
May 2011 the IFRS 10, Consolidated Financial Statements, which has superseded the requirements 
relating to consolidated financial statements in IAS 27. However, it is not effective yet, but just after 
January 2013, and there isn´t changes to NCI or other subjects that could adjust our main research and 
results. Indeed, to develop the previous research study we need to rely on the changes of IAS 27 that were 
effective from 2005.  
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efficient markets theory does suggest that rational investors fully process information 
regardless of the way as they are presented. It does not matter where firms place 
accounting information. The markets adopt a substance over form approach and 
incorporate all publicly available information, irrespective of the way as they are 
presented.  
There is a stream of literature providing evidence that the markets are efficiently 
incorporating accounting information irrespectively of where it appears in the financial 
statements (e.g. Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2006; Jiffi and Citron, 2009). However, other 
studies find the opposite. They provide empirical evidence that investors do price 
accounting information differently according to the way as they are presented in the 
financial statements (e.g. Ahmed et al, 2006; Mitra and Hossain, 2009). We contribute 
to this growing body of literature that provides mixed evidence on the market 
perception of accounting information presented in different ways in the financial 
statements.  
We develop a value-relevance study to examine whether the market prices NCI by 
the same way before and after the adoption of the new standards requiring the NCI to be 
presented within equity, instead of as a mezzanine item between liability and equity. We 
support our analysis on the changes required by the new IAS 27, which was effective in 
2005. To avoid bias in our results from simultaneous changes due to the mandatory of 
IFRS by 2005, we conduct a within-firm design and limit our investigation to IFRS 
early adopters. Germany is particularly well appropriate to our study. Unlike other 
countries, it has a great representation of early adopter firms (e.g., Hung and 
Subramanyam, 2007; Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008), which provides a reasonable 
large sample and an ideal natural experiment for examining the financial effects of the 
movement of NCI without suffer the financial statement effects of the mandatory 
adoption of the complete set of IASB standards by 2005.  
With a sample of 308 firm-years observations over the period covering the years 
2002 through 2007 (excluding year-2005 to avoid potential bias of the first time 
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adoption of the new version of IAS 27)
 19
, we provide new empirical evidence 
suggesting that the location of NCI does not matter in terms of market valuation. To 
guarantee the robustness of our results, we implement a research design that compares 
information under the same accounting system (IAS/IFRS) and for the same set of firms 
before and after the new presentation form of NCI. We control for firm self-selection 
bias from choosing IAS/IFRS versus HGB standards, and, also, from choosing to use or 
do not use NCI as a source of finance. We also perform sensitivity analysis for different 
sub-sample of firms divided based on characteristics like size, leverage and the weight 
of NCI in total consolidated equity.  These findings support those previously found for 
the entire sample.  
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. Firstly, it contributes to the 
literature about market consistency on the valuation of accounting data presented under 
different alternative formats. Findings from previous studies are mixed and involve 
different topics of accounting information. Some studies demonstrate that share prices 
reflect amounts reported on different financial statements similarly (e.g., Jifri and 
Citron, 2009; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2006), and others find the opposite (e.g., Ahmed 
et al, 2006; Mitra and Hossain, 2009). Some authors justifies that, despite of market 
efficiency, there are conditions under which different locations are not equal associated 
with market values. We add to this literature by providing additional evidence that the 
market prices NCI by the same way irrespectively of their location in the consolidated 
statement of financial position. Our findings suggest that the market is consistent and 
the change on the reporting of NCI do not have pricing consequences, which can be 
interpreted as efficiency on the processing of accounting information. 
Secondly, our findings contribute to the scant literature on the value relevance of 
NCI. Some prior studies support the value relevance of NCI while others show that the 
market does not value the NCI presented in the statement of financial position (e.g., 
Abad et al, 2000; So and Smith, 2009a). We provide additional evidence of a significant 
                                                     
19
 Our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of 2005. 
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association between the market value of parent shareholders equity and the amount of 
NCI presented in the statement of financial position. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents literature 
review. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results 
and finally section 5 provides summary and concluding remarks. 
 
4.2. PRIOR RESEARCH 
There are a significant number of prior empirical studies that provides mixed 
evidence on the investor perception of accounting information presented in different 
locations in the financial statements.  
Some studies provide empirical evidence focusing on the investor perception of 
accounting information disclosed in the notes and/or recognized in other financial 
statements (e.g. Ayers, 1998; Davis-Friday et al, 1999; Espahbodi et al, 2002; Cotter 
and Zimmer, 2003; Ahmed et al, 2006; Mitra and Hossain, 2009; Jifri and Citron, 2009; 
Niu and Xiu, 2009). Other studies relies on the accounting information recognized in 
different financial statements (other than notes), namely the statement of comprehensive 
income versus statement of income versus statement of financial position (e.g. Cahan et 
al, 2000; Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2006; So and Smith, 2009b). Finally, there are a few 
studies analyzing accounting information presented in different locations in the same 
financial statement. (e.g. Cahan et al, 2000; So and Smith, 2009a).  
These prior researches cover several accounting subjects, including assets 
revaluations and other components of comprehensive income (e.g. Cahan et al, 2000; 
Cotter and Zimmer, 2003; Mitra and Hossain, 2009), goodwill accounting (e.g. Jifri and 
Citron, 2009), pension accounting (e.g. Davis-Friday et al, 1999), deferred tax 
accounting (e.g. Ayers, 1998),  noncontrolling interests (e.g. So and Smith, 2009a), 
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investment property (e.g. Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2006; So and Smith, 2009b), 
employed stock option (e.g. Espahbodi et al, 2002; Niu and Xu, 2009) and derivative 
financial instruments (e.g. Ahmed et al, 2006). 
These studies use a common approach to identify the way as the market reacts to 
accounting information disclosed or recognized in different locations in the financial 
statements. Usually they analyze cases of changes in accounting regulation
20
. Generally, 
the investor perception is captured by associations between market variables and the 
item reported under alternative locations in the financial statements. When different 
valuations weighs are taken to the same item according to the way it was reported, it is 
suggested that investors perceive the underlying accounting information differently 
(Schipper, 2007). The tests use a within-firm research in an over-time analysis in which 
periods of reporting of an item in one financial statement are followed by periods of 
reporting in another location, frequently due to a change in reporting requirements.   
Prior evidence not always support theoretical framework. Efficient markets theory 
does suggest that in traditional models of financial markets, rational investors fully 
process information regardless of the way as they are presented. This means that would 
not matter where firms place accounting data. The markets adopt a substance over form 
approach and incorporate all publicly available information, irrespectively of the way of 
disclosure and/or recognition. Thus, one would not expect that market prices are 
sensitive to the accounting treatment and the location where the information is 
presented.  
There are some studies providing empirical evidence of cases under which the 
market values similarly the amounts reported on different locations in the financial 
                                                     
20 Another line of research, as in Dhaliwal et al (1999), look at the market perception of different 
accounting information, for instance, the income or comprehensive income as a measure of firm 
performance. However, the authors say the analysis in their study cannot address whether reporting dirty 
surplus items as part of comprehensive income, rather than as direct adjustments to equity, will affect the 
way the market processes accounting information. Another line of research focus on the market 
perception of new information included in financial statements, as, for instance, in Linsmeier et al, 2002. 
Finally, another line of research relates to disclosure versus recognition but as a matter of accounting 
choices, like in Choudhary (2011). These types of researches are not the focus of our study, even though 
we can comment our results with supported arguments from those. 
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statements (e.g. Cahan et al, 2000; Owsu-Ansah and Yeoh, 2006; Jifri and Citron, 
2009). These studies can be identified as using a “no differences” view point in the 
classification of Schipper (2007), positing that once an item has entered the financial 
reports, location and presentation have no direct implications concerning that all 
communications in financial reports are processed based on their informational 
properties, not on how and where they are displayed. 
However, most studies find that the market values differently the amounts 
reported on different locations in the financial statements (e.g. Ayers, 1998; Davis-
Friday et al, 1999; Espahbodi et al, 2002; Cotter and Zimmer, 2003; Ahmed et al, 2006; 
Mitra and Hossain, 2009; So and Smith, 2009a; So and Smith, 2009b). Although these 
differences could be interpreted as market inefficiency, several alternative arguments 
are appointed by studies on this issue, which can be identified as using a “rational 
differences” view point in the classification of Schipper (2007), positing that location 
(primarily disclosure versus recognition) has implications because an item’s location 
reveals something about its decision usefulness.  
There are some arguments appointed for the reason why investors could weight 
information reported on one location more heavily that information in another location 
in the financial statements, namely, reliability of accounting information, costs of 
processing information, contracting costs, cognitive bias, degree of sophistication, 
limited attention of investors and methodological constructions on the research design. 
A great number of authors appoint differences in perceived reliability of 
accounting information as a primary source of differences in the market valuation of 
accounting information presented in diverse locations. The majority relates to 
information recognized in some financial statements versus information disclosed in the 
notes (e.g. Ahmed et al, 2006; Frederikson et al, 2006; Libby et al, 2006; Schipper, 
2007). Schipper (2007) identify archival and experimental research that considers 
management perspectives and auditor behavior, which highlight the reliability of 
disclosed items as one of the most important reasons for why accounting information in 
different locations can imply different analysis. This type of explanation is based on 
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conclusions that auditors are likely to permit more misstatement in a disclosed item than 
in a recognized item and that the difference is due at least in part to an auditor 
perception that errors in disclosed amounts are less material (Libby et al, 2006)
21
. Not 
only auditors, but other users (e.g., students and bankers) are also suggested as seeing 
some accounting information more material and reliable in some financial statements 
assuming differences in perceiving amounts presented in different formats (e.g Harper 
et al, 1987; Choudhary, 2011). Additionally, there are empirical researches finding that 
managers choose recognition for those items that are judged more reliable and 
disclosure for those judged less reliable based on informational qualities (e.g., Cotter 
and Zimmer, 2003).  
Costs of processing information (e.g. Barth et al, 2003) and contracting costs (e.g. 
Espahbodi et al, 2002; Amir et al, 2010; Bamber et al, 2010) are also appointed as a 
source of differences in market perceptions of information presented in notes versus in 
other financial statements. The first case is related to costs assumed to transform 
information provided in a manner that must be unscrambled to be correctly perceived. 
The second case is related to issues (e.g. future earnings, debt contracts and possible of 
violate debt covenants) that would be affected by recognition but not by disclosures. 
Another type of explanations includes cognitive bias of investors (Schiper, 2007) 
or less-sophisticated versus professional investors (e.g., Frederickson and Miller, 2004; 
Allee et al, 2007). These empirical researches find that the degree of knowledge and 
other skills in interpreting accounting information can justify different interpretation of 
accounting depending on its placement. Barth et al (2003) suggest that this problem can 
be a kind of mitigated when the majority of investors are accounting experts. Hirshleifer 
and Teoh (2003) add the “limited attention” motive, suggesting that investors neglect 
relevant aspects of the economic environments they face, such as strategic incentives of 
firms to manipulate investors’ perceptions. This research also points that information 
                                                     
21 Libby et al (2006) indicates that there are three additional possible reasons for such a difference in 
auditor behavior: differences in auditing standards; differences in materiality judgments; and differences 
in auditing practices. 
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that is presented in salient and easily processed form is assumed to be better processed 
than information that is less salient, or that is only implicit in the public information set. 
They say this tends to induce individuals to use information in the form it is displayed 
rather than modifying it appropriately. 
As far as these arguments above can be attributable to all users of financial 
statements, Schipper (2007) emphases investors are assumed to process accounting 
information in the same way, so that any differences in valuation weights can be 
attributed to informational qualities of the items and not to cognitive activities of 
investors. She adverts that archival research can be difficult to interpret. Also 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Kothari (2001) emphases some findings of apparent 
market inefficiency in existing literature may be derived from methodology questions.  
These methodological questions, often attributable to archival research, can 
embrace confusion by self-selection (e.g., Schipper, 2007; Choudhary, 2011), 
difficulties of research setting (e.g., Schipper, 2007), of research design (e.g., Schipper, 
2007; Choudhary, 2011) and of data availability (e.g., Schipper, 2007), risk 
measurement  (e.g. Kothari, 2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh , 2003)  and the effect of 
skewness on financial variables (e.g. Kothari, 2001; Hirshleifer and Teoh , 2003). Also 
simultaneous changes in the valuation, in the accounting regime, or differences in 
information quantity recognition (addressing measurement problems) can be a reason 
for different results for the market perception of accounting information presented in 
different locations (eg., Ahmed et al 2006; Niu and Xu, 2009; Choudhary, 2011)
 22
. 
                                                     
22
 In another kind of justifications, some authors let us to not forget that different information provided in 
different formats should be equaled value by the market, but incremental information provided in another 
financial statement could have incremental value relevance. This was the case of deferred taxes under the 
income statement method instead of balance sheet method (e.g., Chang et al, 2009), meaning investors are 
not confused and price as assets or liabilities accounting information with a positive or negative signal to 
the market. Also, it can be the case that market values differently accounting information according to 
industries’ specifications. Namely, for real state property value (e.g., Kang and Zhao, 2010), accumulated 
depreciation value relevance differs cross industries and market values those accumulated depreciation 
beyond net income and book value of net assets. In this case, investors correctly recognize the 
understatement of real estate property value due to the application of depreciation, irrespectively of the 
way where accounting information is placed. 
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Overall, Schipper (2007) justifies that if “investors are rational, knowledgeable, 
not constrained by cognitive limitations, and not ascribing any meaning to how 
information is presented” (p. 319), thus, the market perception of accounting 
information should not change. Altogether, it looks like what makes the difference is 
not the location of accounting information itself, but other factors. Maines et al. (2003) 
also point that we have to rely on equity prices being, in some sense, “correct” or 
“efficient” – but we do not know if the market is making correct assessments of value 
given the information available. Schipper (2007) also points differences in valuation 
weights when compared to their theoretical values for accounting items, reasonable 
confidence intervals around the estimated valuation weights, and results’ sensitive to 
specification choices as examples to be considered in the analysis. If this is the case, 
Maines et al (2003) posits the results just tell us that investors may not fully understand 
the valuation implications of the accounting information itself. Nevertheless, even if the 
value is not correct, it must be consistently priced. 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) argue that regulators and commentators think that 
investors are imperfect processors of public available information, and such concern is 
reflected in the structure of accounting regulation. This justifies why firms and 
regulators care not just about the information made publicly available to investors, but 
the form in which it is revealed, even when the information content of the alternative 
formats is identical. 
The attention on NCI reporting is of interest because there was a change in the 
accounting regime and there is scarce literature concerning the value relevance of NCI. 
With a sample of Spanish firms, Abad et al (2000) find a very weak support for the 
value relevance of NCI presented inside or outside equity, although some of the values 
attracted to this item were constructed from assumptions and not extracted directly from 
financial statements. By the contrary, with a sample of Hong Kong listed companies, So 
and Smith (2009a) suggested a negative relation of NCI with share prices when they 
were presented outside equity, with a changing in investor´s perceptions after their 
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inclusion inside equity, which are no longer perceived as liabilities (loss relevance). 
They run their empirical research under an environment of changes in the all the scope 
of the accounting regime and this is appointed for some authors (e.g., Choudhary, 2011) 
as one cause of disturbances on market perceptions. Further investigation is therefore 
needed to provide more evidence about the value relevance of NCI and about the impact 
of presenting NCI in different locations.  
 
4.3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.3.1. Changes in IAS/IFRS related to NCI 
The IAS 27, Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements (2003) provides the 
accounting rules for consolidation, including NCI. The first version of this standard was 
issued in 1989. At that time, firms were required to present NCI in a mezzanine section 
of statement of financial position, separately from liabilities and from equity, as a 
hybrid element. However, the revised version of IAS 27, issued in 2003 (effective from 
2005) requires firms to present NCI inside consolidated equity, despite of separately 
from the parent’s shareholders equity.  
This change in the IASB standard on consolidation was firstly motivated by the 
improvements to IAS/IFRS, since the framework for presentation of financial 
statements does not contemplate other elements behind assets, liabilities and equity. 
Secondly, accounting for NCI is one of the topics included in the project on Business 
Combinations jointly developed by the IASB and the FASB. Both boards converged to 
the same procedures on consolidation, and agreed to apply a set of procedures consistent 
with the entity theory. Thus, both group of shareholders – those from the parent 
company and those from the subsidiaries (not wholly owned) – are seeing as 
shareholders of the entire consolidated entity.  
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After January 2005, firms applying IAS 27 started to use a different approach 
when reporting NCI in their consolidated financial statements. These firms report now a 
lower amount for total liabilities and a larger amount for equity, experiencing an 
apparent improvement in credit risk and borrowing capacity, despite a lack of any actual 
change in their underlying economic profile.  
 
4.3.2. Sample and Data 
European firms are required to apply IAS/IFRS mandatorily since 2005. 
Therefore, the impact of the new requirements for consolidation included in the IAS 27 
(effective from 2005) cannot be analyzed separately from the overall impact of the new 
accounting regime (IAS/IFRS). In order to overcome this limitation, the empirical 
analysis relies on a set of firms applying IAS/IFRS voluntarily before 2005. 
Germany is particularly well appropriate to our study. Unlike other countries, it 
has a great representation of early adopters (e.g., Hung and Subramanyam, 2007; Barth, 
Landsman and Lang, 2008), which provides a reasonable large sample and an ideal 
natural experiment for examining the financial effects of the movement of NCI without 
suffer the financial statement effects of IAS/IFRS adoption.  
We use data from German firms applying IAS/IFRS since 2002 in order to 
guarantee that we have a large sample of firms reporting NCI for a long period of 
time
23
. We analyze the three years before and the three years after the change in the 
location of NCI in the statement of financial position. We exclude year 2005 to avoid 
potential bias of the first time adoption of the new version of IAS 27. We want to assure 
that the sample include the same set of firms in all firm-years observations in both 
                                                     
23
 We do not include observations prior to 2002 because we only include early adopters reporting NCI in 
all years covered by the sample and, before this date, even in Germany, the sample would be much 
reduced. 
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periods of time. So, our analysis relies on data from 2002 to 2004 and from 2006 to 
2008 for exactly the same set of firms.  
We use the following procedures to identify our sample. First, we collect data 
from Datastream Worlscope
®
 to identify all the German firms (non-financials) applying 
IAS/IFRS in 2002 as the unique standards followed to prepare their consolidated 
financial statements. Second, we selected only those firms presenting positive NCI for 
all the six years included in the analysis. Third, we pull together all firms with 
accounting and market data available for all the years. Fourth, we exclude firms with 
negative book value of equity.  Finally, to ensure that regression results are not 
influenced by outlying observations, the top and bottom one percent of each continuous 
variable distribution and also the observations with absolute studentized residual above 
3 have been eliminated. Thus, the final sample is composed of 308 firm-year 
observations for 54 firms. 
Table 4.1 presents the sample distribution across industries. Despite some 
dispersion of firms between industries, the manufacturing industries (SIC one-digit 3) is 
the most dominant with 32%, followed by the Services and by the other manufacturing 
Industries (one-digit SIC 2) with 22% and 18%, respectively.  
 
 
TABLE 4.1 
 Sample composition by industry 
      N   % 
Mining and Construction      23   7% 
Manufacturing - Type I      54   18% 
Manufacturing - Type II      100   32% 
Utilities      40   13% 
Wholesale/Retail trade      24   8% 
Services      67   22% 
    308   100% 
 
The industry decomposition follows the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) for classifying 
industries, namely: Minning and Construction (SIC 1000-1999); Manufacturing - type I (SIC 2000-
2999); Manufacturing - type II (SIC 3000-3999), Utilities (SIC 4000-4999); Wholesale trade and 
Retail trade (SIC 5000-5999); Service Industries (SIC 7000-9999). 
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4.3.3. Research Method 
4.3.3.1. Valuation Model 
This paper investigates whether the market prices NCI by the same way 
irrespectively of their location in the consolidated statement of financial position. We 
expect to find whether, after the effectiveness of the new IAS 27 in 2005, the change in 
the way as NCI is reported on the consolidated statement of financial position is 
associated with a change in the investor´s perceptions of this accounting item.  
The empirical model employed in this study relies on a general equity valuation 
model, which expresses the market value of equity as a function of the book value of 
equity and net income, 
 
given by Equation (1),
24
 
 
                              (1) 
 
where MV are the market value of equity at the fiscal year end
25
, BV and NI are 
respectively the book value of equity attributable to parent shareholders and net income, 
and  is value-relevant information not yet reflected in BV and NI. In order to mitigate 
scale effect problems, all the variables are deflated by the number of shares outstanding, 
resulting in a per share basis. 
Prior literature shows that the market valuation of net income is rather different 
for cases with negative amounts (e.g., Rees, 1999). The market expect profits to persist, 
meanwhile losses are not expected to persist in the future (e.g., Hayn, 1995; Chang, 
Herbohn and Tutticci, 2009). Since shareholders can liquidate a firm rather than suffer 
from persistent losses, investors perceive losses as temporary (Hayn, 1995). Therefore, 
                                                     
24
 As suggested by Barth and Glinch (2009), this model must not accurately portray all aspects of real 
firms but it is an established, parsimonious, and well-accepted valuation theory that is the basis for much 
extant empirical accounting capital markets research. 
25
 We also develop all the equations with data from three months after the fiscal year end.  
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we use a new estimating equation, Equation (2), which allows the relation between the 
market value of equity and net income to vary according to whether net income is 
positive or negative and is given by 
 
                                           (2) 
 
where LOSS is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for firms with negative NI and 0 
otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction term NI x LOSS reflects how the market’s 
valuation of losses differs from its valuation of profits. To the extent losses are more 
weakly associated with firm market value than profits, we expect that 03  . 
Prior literature provides some empirical evidence that NCI has significant 
explanatory power for stock prices over the traditional summary accounting measures 
such as book value of equity and net income (e.g. Abad et al, 2000; So and Smith, 
2009a). Given our focus on the market valuation of NCI, we use a new regression 
equation, Equation (3), which comprises the variable NCI. This is defined as the equity 
in a subsidiary not attributable, directly or indirectly, to a parent and it represents the 
amount displayed in the consolidated financial position of the parent company at fiscal 
year end.  
 
                                                   (3) 
 
  
In order to analyze whether the market prices by the same way the NCI reported 
as a mezzanine item outside equity (before 2005) and the NCI reported as equity (after 
2005), we use a final estimating equation, Equation (4), which allows all the 
coefficients in Equation (3) to vary according to whether the accounting data relate to 
the period before or after the effectiveness of the new requirements of IAS 27 by 2005. 
Our Equation (4) is given by   
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                  (4)  
 
where AFTER is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for the observations 
belonging to the period after 2005 and 0 otherwise. This equation is estimated with 
industry fixed effects.   
The coefficient on the interaction term AFTER x NCI reflects how the market’s 
valuation of NCI presented inside equity (after 2005) differ from its valuation of NCI as 
a mezzanine item outside equity (before 2005). To the extent that the market valuation 
of NCI after 2005 is different from the market valuation before 2005, we expect that 
9 is statistically significant. By contrast, if the market values NCI by the same way 
irrespectively of its location in the statement of financial position, than 9 would be not 
statistically significant.   
As our analysis relies on a set of firms applying voluntarily IAS/IFRS and 
reporting NCI in their consolidated statement of financial position, they could not 
represent a random selection of all the German firms (e.g., Hung and Subramanyam, 
2007). To control for the potential effect of self-selection bias, we apply the two-stage 
regression procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) in all subsequent analysis in this 
paper. In the first stage we use two binary logistic models which identify the 
determinants of choice to adopt IAS/IFRS voluntarily as well as the choice of having 
NCI. The estimated value in each of these two binary logistic models is then used to 
generate the Inverse Mills ratio for each observation (as explained in section 3.2.2). In 
the second stage, we use these Inverse Mills ratios as additional explanatory variables in 
our linear regression model stated in Equation (4) which parameters will be estimated 
by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. 
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4.3.3.2 Binary Logistic Models - Controlling for self-selection bias 
In this section, we describe the first-stage analysis used in this study, in which we 
estimate two binary logistic models. The first one concerns self-selection for IAS/IFRS 
early adopter firms. The second one concerns self-selection for using NCI as a source of 
financing. 
 
A. Self selection regarding the choice to adopt IAS/IFRS voluntary 
Considering a wide range of German firms applying either IAS/IFRS or German 
GAAP, we control for potential self selection bias due to the accounting standards 
choice before the mandatory adoption of IAS/IFRS by 2005. We use a binary logistic 
regression to estimate the effects on the odds of a firm choice to adopt IAS/IFRS 
voluntary before 2005. Our dependent variable is a binary variable which assumes 1 for 
German firms applying IAS/IFRS voluntarily in the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 and 0 
for German firms applying local GAAP during the same period. Following prior studies 
(e.g. Harris and Muller, 1999; Leuz, 2003; Hung and Subramanyan, 2007; Barth et al, 
2008), we predict that incentives to apply IAS/IFRS voluntarily include profitability, 
leverage, size, listing status, auditor type and industry. More specifically, we estimate 
the following logit model: 
 
                                                      
   ∑            (5) 
 
where Early is a binary variable which assumes 1 for firms applying IAS/IFRS 
voluntarily in the period 2002-2004 and 0 for firms applying German GAAP in the 
period 2002-2004, ROE is the firm’s return on equity, LEV is the firm’s leverage 
measured as total liabilities divided by total assets, SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
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market capitalization, XLIST is a binary variable which assumes 1 for firms listed in 
more than one stock exchange and 0 otherwise, AUD is a binary variable which assumes 
1 for firms audited by a Big4 audit firm and 0 otherwise and IND are indicator variables 
based on one-digit SIC codes.  
This binary logistic regression is estimated on a sample of 853 observations, 
comprising 463 firm-year observations for German firms applying IAS/IFRS 
voluntarily in the period 2002-2004 and 390 firm-year observations for German firms 
applying German GAAP in the same period. Using this logistic model, we compute the 
Inverse Mills ratios for each observation, denoted by DELTA. We then include this 
DELTA variable in all subsequent regression models, procedure known as second-stage, 
providing the control for self-selection bias. 
 
B. Self selection regarding the choice of using NCI 
Considering only the group of German IAS/IFRS early adopter firms, we control 
for potential self selection bias due to the choice of using NCI as a source of financing. 
We use a binary logistic regression to estimate the effects on the odds of a firm choice 
of using NCI. Our dependent variable is a binary variable which assumes 1 for German 
IAS/IFRS early adopter firms reporting NCI in their consolidated statement of financial 
position every year during the entire sample period and 0 for German IAS/IFRS early 
adopter firms who have never reported NCI during the entire sample period. Following 
prior studies (e.g. Lourenço and Lopes, 2011), we predict that incentives for using NCI 
as a source of finance include profitability, leverage, size and industry. More 
specifically, we estimate the following logit model: 
 
                                         ∑             
 (6) 
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where NCI_FIN is a binary variable which assumes 1 for firms reporting NCI 
every year during the entire sample period 0 for firms who have never reported NCI 
during the entire sample period, ROE is the firm’s return on equity, LEV is the firm’s 
leverage measured as total liabilities divided by total assets, SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization and IND are indicator variables based on one-digit 
SIC codes. In addition, since the change in the way of reporting NCI could have an 
impact in the decision of using NCI, we also include a separate dummy variable that 
split the periods before and after the application of the new version of IAS 27. 
This second binary regression is estimated on a sample of 463 firm-years 
observations for German IAS/IFRS early adopters firms, comprising 313 firm-year 
observations for firms reporting NCI and 150 firm-year observations for firms that were 
not reporting NCI during the entire sample period. Using this logistic model, we 
compute the Inverse Mills ratios for each observation, denoted by IOTA. We then 
include this IOTA variable in all subsequent OLS regression models, procedure known 
as second-stage, providing the control for self-selection bias. 
 
4.4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
4.4.1 Binary Logistic Models 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present findings of the two binary logistic models used in the 
first stage procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) and applied in this study.  
Empirical evidence on the firm’s choice about the accounting standards applied in 
their financial statements before the mandatory adoption of IAS/IFRS by 2005 is 
reported in Table 4.2.  
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TABLE 4.2 
 Descriptive Statistics for IAS/IFRS Early versus Mandatory Adopters Firms 
Panel A: Firms ´characteristics  
 
Observations N Mean Std.dev. t-test 
      
ROE Early adopter firms 463 -0.008 0.547 -2.617*** 
  Mandatory adopter firms 390 0.076 0.387 
 
LEV Early adopter firms 463 0.560 0.198 -2.501** 
  Mandatory adopter firms 390 0.592 0.175 
 
SIZE Early adopter firms 463 12.461 2.329 6.613*** 
  Mandatory adopter firms 390 11.487 1.972 
 
XLIST Early adopter firms 463 0.611 0.488 2.593*** 
  Mandatory adopter firms 390 0.523 0.500 
 
AUD Early adopter firms 463 0.622 0.485 2.918*** 
  Mandatory adopter firms 390 0.523 0.500 
  
 
Panel B: binary logistic model - choice to adopt IAS/IFRS voluntary  
  
Coef. 
   
Constant 
 
-3.531*** 
   
ROE 
 
-0.999*** 
   
 LEV 
 
-1.582*** 
   
SIZE 
 
0.363*** 
   
XLIST 
 
0.101   
   
AUD 
 
0.023 
   
N 
 
863 
   
Nagel Kerke R Square 0,197 
    
This sample comprises German firms applying IAS/IFRS since 2002 (early adopters) and German firms 
applying German GAAP in the period 2002-2004 and IAS/IFRS after 2005 (mandatory adopters). The 
sample covers the period between 2002 and 2008 (excluding 2005). 
 
ROE is Return on Equity, calculated as the net income attributable to common shareholders divided by the 
parent shareholders´ common equity, LEV is leverage measured by total liabilities divided by total assets 
and SIZE is a measure of firm size, being the natural logarithm of market capitalization, XLIST is a 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is quoted in more than one stock exchange and 0 
otherwise, AUD is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the parent company is audited by a Big 
4, and 0 otherwise. Industry fixed effect is included. 
 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Characteristics of German firms applying IAS/IFRS since 2002 (early adopters) 
and German firms applying German GAAP in the period 2002-2004 and IAS/IFRS after 
2005 (mandatory adopters) are compared in Panel A. We find that IAS/IFRS early 
adopters firms are significantly larger (SIZE), not so leveraged (LEV) and with a lower 
return on equity (ROE), more likely to be listed in several stock exchanges (XLIST) and 
more likely to be audited by a BIG 4 audit firm (AUD) than mandatory adopter firms, 
with each of these differences being significant.  These findings are consistent with 
prior literature on this issue (e.g., Bartov et al, 2005). As well, we find that book value, 
net income, total assets and total liabilities (not tabulated) are significantly higher for 
the group of firms early adopters of IAS/IFRS than mandatory adopters, which is 
consistent with previous literature finding these amounts are significant higher under 
IAS/IFRS than under German GAAP (e.g. Leuz, 2003, Bartov et al, 2005, Hung and 
Subramanyan, 2007).  
The coefficient estimates of the accounting standards choice logit model are 
presented in Panel B. We find that the coefficients on ROE, LEV and SIZE are 
statistically significantly (p<0,000) and XLIST and AUD are positive. Overall, our 
estimation results are consistent with prior literature suggesting the existence of 
incentives on firm characteristics to apply IAS/IFRS voluntarily.Empirical evidence on 
the firm’s choice about using NCI as a source of financing is reported in Table 4.3. 
Characteristics of German IAS/IFRS early adopter firms reporting NCI every year 
during the entire sample period (early adopters with NCI) and those who have never 
reported NCI during the same period (early adopters without NCI) are compared in 
Panel A. We find that early adopter firms with NCI are significantly larger (SIZE), more 
leveraged (LEV) and more profitable (ROE) when compared to early adopter firms 
without NCI. These findings are consistent with prior literature on this issue (e.g. 
Lourenço and Lopes, 2011). The coefficient estimates of the NCI choice logit model are 
presented in Panel B. We find that the coefficients on ROE (p>0,100), LEV (p<0,001) 
and SIZE (p<0,000) are positive. Overall, our estimation results are in line with prior 
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literature suggesting the existence of distinctive characteristics between those firms 
using NCI as a source of finance and those firms that never used. 
 
TABLE 4.3 
 Descriptive Statistics for IAS/IFRS Early Adopter Firms With and Without NCI 
Panel A: Firms ´characteristics  
 
Observations N Mean Std.dev. t-test 
ROE Early adopter firms with NCI 313 0.047 0.271 5,681** 
  Early adopter firms without NCI 150 -0.122 0.869 
 
LEV Early adopter firms with NCI 313 0.047 0.271 5,681** 
  Early adopter firms without NCI 150 -0.122 0.869 
 
SIZE Early adopter firms with NCI 313 13.212 2.251 12,732*** 
  Early adopter firms without NCI 150 10.893 1.598 
  
 
Panel B: binary logistic model - choice to use NCI as a source of financing  
  
Coef. 
   
Constant 
 
-7.262*** 
   
ROE 
 
0.303 
   
 LEV 
 
2.017** 
   
SIZE 
 
0.570*** 
   
N 
 
463 
   
Nagel Kerke R2 0.409 
   
  
This sample comprises German early adopter firms reporting NCI every year during the entire sample 
period (early adopters with NCI) and those who have never reported NCI during the same period (early 
adopters without NCI) The sample covers the period between 2002 and 2008 (excluding 2005). 
 
ROE is Return on Equity, calculated as the net income attributable to common shareholders divided by the 
parent shareholders´ common equity, LEV is leverage measured by total liabilities divided by total assets 
and SIZE is a measure of firm size, being the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Industry fixed 
effect is included. 
 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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4.4.2. OLS Valuation Model 
Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 present findings of the OLS valuation model used in the 
second stage procedure suggested by Heckman (1979) and applied in this study.  
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the valuation  model are reported 
in Table 4.4, for the entire sample (Panel A) and for the two periods covering 2002-
2004 (Panel B) and 2006-2008 (Panel C), which means respectively the periods before 
and after the effectiveness of the new requirements of IAS 27 by 2005. When 
comparing these two periods (Panel D), we find that the variables MV and NI are 
statistically higher in the period 2006-2008 than in 2002-2004, while for the variables 
BV and NCI statistically differences cannot be found. 
Table 4.5 presents correlations for the continuous variables used in the OLS 
valuation model. Consistent with established results in the accounting literature, the 
market value of equity is positively and statistically related with BV and NI. The 
independent continuous variables included in the regression, whilst showing some 
indications of collinearity, have no pairwise correlation coefficients in excess of 0.80, 
indicating that the threat of multicollinearity is limited. 
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TABLE 4.4 
Summary Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
            
Panel A: 308 observations, pooled sample       
MV 25.66 17.63 27.70 0.5488 164.9879 
BV 17.52 10.57 24.25 0.4919 170.0822 
NI 1.63 0.98 3.04 -5.2165 26.4980 
NCI 1.27 0.20 3.86 0.0002 37.4243 
        
  
Panel B: 157 observations for the period 2002-2004 
MV 19.58 13.06 23.02 0.5488 139.9899 
BV 16.01 9.16 26.06 0.4919 170.0822 
NI 0.88 0.69 1.99 -5.2165 8.6505 
NCI 1.48 0.17 4.82 0.0002 37.4243 
            
Panel C: 151 observations for the period 2006-2008   
MV 31.98 22.76 30.68 0.6770 164.9879 
BV 19.09 11.38 22.18 0.5447 124.3133 
NI 2.42 1.41 3.69 -3.6995 26.4980 
NCI 1.05 0.24 2.49 0.0003 16.8900 
 
                                      
 
Panel D: Paired sample T-test for differences in means 
  
 
        t-test 
 
MV:               2002-2004 versus 2006-2008   -4.306*** 
 
BV:                2002-2004 versus 2006-2008   -1.229 
 
NI:                2002-2004 versus 2006-2008   -4.779*** 
 
NCI:              2002-2004 versus 2006-2008   1.181 
         
 
 
 
The sample comprises German early adopter firms reporting NCI every year during the entire 
sample period, covering the years between between 2002 and 2008 (excluding 2005). 
 
MV is market value of equity per share at the fiscal year end, BV is book value of equity per share 
attributable to parent shareholders, NI is net income per share attributable to parent shareholders, 
LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with negative NI and 0 otherwise, NCI 
is the portion of equity in subsidiaries per share not attributable to the parent.  
 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4.5 
 Correlations 
 
MV BV NI NCI DELTA IOTA 
MV 1 0.832*** 0.678*** 0.466*** 0.163*** 0.325*** 
BV 0.823*** 1 0.624*** 0.759*** -0.016 0.158*** 
NI 0.778*** 0.709*** 1 0.324*** 0.038 0.220*** 
NCI 0.440*** 0.565*** 0.435*** 1 -0.128** 0.039 
DELTA 0.247*** 0.101 0.043 0-.154*** 1 0.458*** 
IOTA 0.537*** 0.446*** 0.357*** 0.234*** 0.439*** 1 
 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal 
The sample comprises German early adopter firms reporting NCI every year during the entire sample 
period, covering the years between 2002 and 2008 (excluding 2005). 
 
MV is market value of equity per share at the fiscal year end, BV is book value of equity per share 
attributable to parent shareholders, NI is net income per share attributable to parent shareholders, 
LOSS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with negative NI and 0 otherwise, NCI 
is the portion of equity in subsidiaries per share not attributable to the parent. DELTA is the Inverse 
mills ratio of the first-stage of Heckman (1979) procedure computed from binary logistic model to 
control for self selection bias related to the choice to adopt IAS/IFRS voluntary, IOTA is the Inverse 
mills ratio of the first-stage of Heckman (1979) procedure computed from binary logistic model to 
control for self selection bias related to the choice to use NCI as a source of financing.  
 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4.6 shows regression statistics resulting from the OLS estimation of 
Equation (4), controlling for self selection bias, which allows all the coefficients to vary 
according to whether the accounting data relate to the period before or after the 
effectiveness of the new requirements of IAS 27 by 2005.  
The empirical results in Column 1 (C1) highlight the value relevance of 
summary accounting measures, as well as other information namely the amount of NCI 
reported on the consolidated financial position. The coefficients estimates for the 
variable BV is positive and statistically significant (α1=0,966; p-value < 0,000), which 
is not the case of NI whose coefficient is not statistically significant (α2=1,059; p-value 
> 0,100). This result for NI is consistent with Hung and Subramanyan (2007). When 
comparing the value relevance of IAS/IFRS measures with German GAAP measures of 
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BV and NI, they found that in Germany there is a greater noise (measurement error) in 
the IAS/IFRS NI justifying the lack of value relevance for this variable.  
.  
TABLE 4.6  
 OLS Regression results 
      C1    C2  
      Coef. t-test   Coef. t-test 
Intercept     -28.302 -6.03 ***   -28.3 -6,03 *** 
BV     0.966 10.366 ***         
NI     1.059 1.16           
LOSSxNI     -0.687 -0.403           
NCI     -1.621 -3.652 ***         
AFTER     5.323 2.818 ***   5.323 2,818 *** 
AFTERxBV     0.114 0.995     1.08 15,245 *** 
AFTERxNI     -0.486 -0.493     0.573 1,43   
AFTERxLOSSxNI   3,376 1.261     2.689 1.299   
AFTERxNCI   0,43 0.686     -1.191 -2.554 ** 
DELTA     29.702 3.844 ***   29.702 3,844 *** 
IOTA     10.731 2.151 ***   10.731 2,151 *** 
                    
BEFORExBV           0.966 10.366 *** 
BEFORExNI           1.059 1.16   
BEFORExLOSSxNI           -0.687 -0.403   
BEFORExNCI           -1.621 -3.652 *** 
N 
 
308 
  
308 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0,828 
  
0.830 
 Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal. 
 
The sample comprises German early adopter firms reporting NCI every year during the entire sample period, 
covering the years between 2002 and 2008 (excluding 2005). 
 
MV is market value of equity per share at the fiscal year end, BV is book value of equity per share attributable to 
parent shareholders, NI is net income  per share attributable to parent shareholders, LOSS is a  dummy variable that  
takes the value of 1 for firms with negative NI and 0 otherwise, NCI is the portion of equity in subsidiaries per 
share not attributable to the parent. AFTER is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firm years 
observations for the period between 2006 and 2008 and 0 otherwise, BEFORE is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for firm years observations for the period 2002 and 2004 and 0 otherwise. DELTA is the Inverse mills 
ratio of the first-stage of Heckman (1979) procedure computed from binary logistic model to control for self 
selection bias related to the choice to adopt IAS/IFRS voluntary, IOTA is the Inverse mills ratio of the first-stage of 
Heckman (1979) procedure computed from binary logistic model to control for self selection bias related to the 
choice to use NCI as a source of financing. Industry fixed effect is included. 
 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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The coefficient estimate for the variable NCI is negative and statistically 
significant (α4=-1,621; p-value < 0,001). These results provide evidence that investors 
believe NCI have wealth-sharing characteristics and could downgrade the market price 
of the parent companies’ shareholders (e.g Swanson, 2010). They also confirm prior 
empirical results for the value relevance of NCI in German firms (e.g .Lopes and 
Lourenço, 2011b)
26
.  
The coefficient estimate for the interaction term of NCI with the binary variable 
AFTER reflects how the market’s valuation of NCI presented inside equity (after 2005) 
differs from its valuation of NCI as a mezzanine item outside equity (before 2005). The 
results reported in Table 4.6, C1, shows that this coefficient is not statistically 
significant (α9=0,430; p-value > 0,100), suggesting the market do not place a different 
weight on NCI when they are reported inside equity. Therefore, we conclude that the 
market values NCI by the same way irrespectively of its location in the statement of 
financial position.  
The results presented in Column 2 (C2) corroborate this conclusion. While C1 
identified an absence of any differential effect on the variables after the inclusion of 
NCI in equity in the after-2005 period, C2 identify the statistical significance of each 
one of the variables separately for each period of time (before and after the inclusion of 
NCI inside equity by 2005). The coefficient estimate for the variable NCI is negative 
and statistically significant either before or after 2005. Moreover, assuming that the 
market views NCI reported outside equity in the same way as reported inside equity, 
then, the coefficient of BEFORExNCI should be equal to AFTERxNCI. Untabulated 
findings shows that the coefficient estimates for the interaction term of NCI with the 
variables BEFORE and AFTER are not statistically different
27
.  
                                                     
26
 From this point ahead until the end of chapter 4, the references of Lopes and Lourenço (2011) and 
(2011b) are coincided with the papers on Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, respectively. 
27
 The Wald test (untabulated) was applied to the other pair-variables and we cannot reject the null of the 
equality of the coefficient on each one of the variables interacted with the variables BEFORE and 
AFTER.  
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Our findings suggest that the IAS 27 revision does not change the investor’s 
perceptions about NCI. Thus, reporting NCI as an element of equity or as an element 
outside equity does not matter, in the sense that investors are not fully confused with the 
location under which NCI are reported on consolidated statement of financial position 
and prices then consistently with the former years. These results are consistent with 
prior literature showing that the market values similarly the amounts reported on 
different locations in the financial statements (e.g. Cahan et al 2000, Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh, 2006, Jifri and Citron, 2009) and, once an item has entered in financial reports, 
location have no direct implications (e.g. Schipper 2007). These arguments justify that 
if the market is consistent, the association between NCI and share prices will be 
analogous and investors react similarly to NCI reported as non-equity or equity 
component.  
In this particular point regarding the period after the revision of IAS 27, our 
results are different from So and Smith (2009a) but not total comparable. In their study 
on the value relevance of IAS 27 on presentation of NCI, they include not only the 
revision of Japanese equivalent-to IAS 27 standard, but, simultaneous, the adoption of a 
new set of accounting standards in Japan, equivalent word-for-word to IFRS. They find 
a negative relation of NCI with share prices only when they were presented outside 
equity, and no value relevance of NCI when presented inside equity after 2005. The 
environment of changes in the all the scope of the accounting regime and this is 
appointed for some authors (e.g., Choudhary, 2011) as one cause of disturbances on 
market perceptions. Thus, we give confidence to our results across prior empirical 
studies that provide mixed evidence on the investor’s perception of accounting 
information presented in different locations in the financial statements. This argument 
can be justified as follows. 
Reliability is appointed by some authors as a primary source of differences in the 
market valuation of accounting information accordingly with different locations in 
financial statements accordingly, primarily in the notes versus other financial statements 
(e.g. Ahmed et al, 2006; Frederikson et al, 2006; Libby et al, 2006; Schipper, 2007). 
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However, reporting NCI outside equity or within equity, is so reliable before as after 
IAS 27 (2003) revision, since the unique change was location but in the same financial 
statement, namely, the consolidated statement of financial position. Further, it seems 
that will be no additional costs to process new information (e.g. Barth et al, 2003), 
although some authors appoint the potential need to revise debt covenants due to some 
changes in ratios analyses after the inclusion of NCI within equity (e.g Nicolaev, 2010).  
Considering that investors are assumed to process accounting information in the 
same way, Schipper (2007), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Kotari (2001) emphasis 
that apparent market inefficiency in existing literature may be derived from 
methodology questions, like self-selection and other confusing effects, often attributable 
to archival research. Trying to overcome these potential difficulties, we controlled for 
self selection (e.g. Choudhary, 2011) of IAS/IFRS early adoption using the two-stage 
procedure suggest by Heckman (1979). We also controlled for the decision to use NCI 
as a source of finance (as compared to firms that never used NCI in the period covered 
by our analysis).  Since we use only early adopter firms, our study is not influenced by 
simultaneous differences in measurement of other assets, liabilities and components of 
earnings due to a transition to a different accounting regime (e.g., Ahmed et al, 2006, 
Niu and Xu, 2009, Choudhary, 2011). More precisely, our research includes the same 
set of firms before and after the change on NCI reporting, providing firm’s bookkeeping 
system in the same manner (e.g., Jifri and Citron, 2009; Choudhary, 2011), assuring that 
the initial amounts recorded for both sets of NCI (before and after 2005) are equally 
objective and free from systematic bias. Thus, our results provide evidence on the 
consistency of investors on pricing NCI and it seems that they are not confused with the 
change in the reporting format.  
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4.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
4.4.3.1 Scale effects 
Potential for incorrect inferences in capital market-based accounting research 
associated with size differences between sample firms is frequently appointed in value 
relevance studies as scale effects(e.g., Barth and Clinch, 2009; Gil-Alana et al, 2011). 
Several possible solutions to mitigate this scale effect bias are found in the literature, 
namely, deflating continuous variables by lagged (i.e., beginning of period) total market 
capitalization. To assure the robustness of our results we perform an additional analysis, 
using alternative ways of deflating variables. Consistent with Ahmed et al. (2006), Jifri 
and Citron (2009) and Hung and Subramanyam (2007), we repeat our OLS Regression 
Equation (4) but scaling the variables by the lagged market value per share instead of 
the number of shares outstanding. The analysis (not tabulated) indicates that the signs 
and significance levels of our coefficients are qualitatively unchanged, with the 
exception of a slight decrease in the statistical significance of NCI and in the  adjusted 
R squared of the model. Thus, our general conclusions are unchanged after such 
deflation. Also, to ensure that all accounting data other information are in the public 
domain, we then run our Equation (4) with market information three months after fiscal 
year end. Once more, our result (not tabulated) maintains.  
 
4.4.3.2 Firm Characteristics  
We also perform additional analyses in order to find whether our results could be 
sensitive to differences in firm characteristics. More precisely, we re-run our OLS 
Regression Equation (4) for different groups of firm-year observations accordingly with 
three firm characteristics, namely, the weight of NCI in the total of consolidated equity 
(NCI included), firm size and leverage. The three panels (A, B and C) of Table 4.7 
present the results of these regressions.  
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TABLE 4.7 
Results for the partition of sample by firm characteristics 
Panel A: Firms split based on the weight of NCI  
    Low   High   
    n= 154   n= 154   
    coef. t-test   coef. t-test   
                
NCI   0,301 0,021   -3,028 -5,903 *** 
AFTERxNCI   14,551 0,836   0,383 0,533   
                
Panel B: Firms split based on size       
    Low   High   
    n= 154   n= 154   
    coef. t-test   coef. t-test   
                
NCI   -3,150 -9,646 *** 1,168 0,968   
AFTERxNCI   -0,917 -0,982   -1,041 -0,788   
                
Panel C: Firms split based on leverage       
    Low   High   
    n= 154   n= 154   
    coef. t-test   coef. t-test   
              
 
NCI   -3,459 -5,953 *** 1,214 1,951 ** 
AFTERxNCI   0,690 0,701   -0,727 -0,942   
 
The sample comprises German early adopter firms reporting NCI every year during the entire sample period, 
covering the years between 2002 and 2008 (excluding 2005). 
 
MV is market value of equity per share at the fiscal year end, BV is book value of equity per share attributable to 
parent shareholders, NI is net income per share attributable to parent shareholders, LOSS is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for firms with negative NI and 0 otherwise, NCI is the portion of equity in subsidiaries per 
share not attributable to the parent. AFTER is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firm years 
observations for the period between 2006 and 2008 and 0 otherwise, DELTA is the Inverse mills ratio of the first-
stage of Heckman (1979) procedure computed from binary logistic model to control for self selection bias related to 
the choice to adopt IAS/IFRS voluntary, IOTA is the Inverse mills ratio of the first-stage of Heckman (1979) 
procedure computed from binary logistic model to control for self selection bias related to the choice to use NCI as 
a source of financing.  
Industry fixed effect is included. 
 
The results to other variables other than NCI and AFTERxNCI were suppressed. 
 
***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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These results are consistent with those presented in Table 4.6, although the 
market perception of NCI varies according to different firm characteristics.  
For those firms in which the weight of NCI in total consolidated equity is low 
(i.e. below the median) NCI have no value relevance to the market, and there is no 
incremental effect on prices after their inclusion within equity after 2005. A possible 
explanation for the absence of value relevance can be due to the fact that in these firms 
NCI are just a smaller part of consolidated equity, providing that their impact in the 
consolidated statement of financial position is closer to zero, reason why their presence 
can be not valued by the market. By the contrary, for those firms in which the weight of 
NCI in total consolidated equity is higher (i.e. above the median) NCI have an inverse 
relation to share prices, before and after their inclusion within equity after 2005, 
consistent with the results for the polled sample.   
For higher firms (i.e., those firm-year observations above the median of the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization) NCI as well do not have value relevance, 
neither before nor after their reporting within equity after 2005. For this case, a possible 
explanation consistent with Swanson (2010) relates to the fact that large firms can 
access to alternative sources of finance, and have the facility to maintain NCI when they 
are is useful and to eliminate them when they are detrimental. Thus, investors do not put 
a negative nor positive impact on the amounts reported for NCI in large firms. By the 
contrary, for smaller firms (i.e., those firms below the median of the natural logarithm 
of market capitalization) NCI have an inverse relation to share prices, before and after 
their inclusion within equity after 2005, consistent with the results for the polled 
sample.   
For lower leveraged firms (i.e., those firm-year observations below the median 
of the natural logarithm of market capitalization) the inverse relation between NCI and 
share prices still hold for both periods in which NCI are reported in different locations. 
However, for higher leveraged firms, this is the only time in this study that the NCI 
variable does have a positive statistically significant with share prices, both before and 
after their inclusion in equity. A possible explanation could include the fact that as the 
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amount of debt increases, the firm cannot have access to finance other than partners 
inside the entity group. In this case, the presence of NCI as a source of alternative 
finance can impact positively in share prices.  
 Altogether, these findings confirm our prior predictions. They provide evidence 
that the market prices NCI in the same manner, irrespectively of their location and the 
market perception is not affected by the inclusion of NCI within equity. 
 
4.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main question this study addresses is whether the market prices NCI in the 
consolidated statement of financial position in the same way irrespectively of their 
location in the consolidated statement of financial position. We concentrate on this 
question by estimating cross-sectional equity valuation regressions to assess whether the 
market prices NCI reported as equity in the same manner as NCI reported as non-equity, 
given the market perception of NCI.  
The IAS 27 revision, issued in 2003 and effective in 2005, gave a unique 
opportunity to do develop this study. The previous version of IAS 27 required the NCI 
to be reported on a mezzanine item between liability and equity, while since 2005 to 
date IAS 27 requires the movement of NCI from the mezzanine section of consolidated 
statement of financial position to within equity.  
In order to achieve our goal, we performed a cross-sectional valuation model, 
covering a within-firm analysis with a sample of German early adopters of IAS/IFRS 
before and after the revision of IAS 27. Similar to Choudhary (2011) we use a unique 
setting of firms to overcome three typical problems with studies that compare 
accounting data presented under different financial statements. Firstly, the inclusion of 
just IAS/IFRS early adopters prevents the bias from changes in the accounting regime in 
2005. Secondly, the adoption of IAS 27 in 2005 do not changed the measurement of 
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NCI and other variables. Third, we use the so-called two stage procedure of Heckman 
(1979) to control for self-selection.  
Results indicate that the market prices NCI similarly before and after their 
inclusion in equity. To be precise, the main conclusion is that there is no differential or 
incremental value relevance in NCI when they move from outside equity to within 
equity, providing that the alternative ways of reporting of NCI do not matter to market 
valuation.  
Although the market perception of NCI could vary according to different firms’ 
characteristics, our findings show that the change in the location where they are reported 
on the consolidated financial statement had no effect in their explanatory power to share 
prices.   
Our findings contribute to the literature concerning market consistency in 
pricing accounting data presented in different locations of financial statements. Our 
contribution to this stream of literature provides evidence that NCI are valued in the 
same manner before and after the new requirements of accounting standards. Namely, 
investors are not sensitive to changes in reporting location. We contribute, also, to the 
scant literature concerning the value relevance of NCI, finding that the market prices 
differently the NCI according to the weigh in the consolidated financial statements, the 
firm size and the leverage.  
Overall, our results give evidence that investors fully incorporate and process all 
the information about NCI, and could price them differently according to firm 
characteristics, but similarly according to the location where they are reported. These 
findings suggest the consistency of investors on pricing NCI and it seems that they are 
not confused with the change in the reporting format.  
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5.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND CONTRIBUTIONS   
This thesis is a result of an intensive empirical study that covers several issues on 
the determinants and market assessment of the NCI in subsidiaries, outlined in three 
independent but related research papers. Overall, in the first paper we identified firm 
and country determinants for the pattern of use of NCI in fourteen European countries. 
In the second paper we examined whether the market values NCI in a different way 
depending on the institutional environment of the parent company. Finally, in the third 
paper we analyzed whether the market prices NCI by the same way before and after the 
adoption of the new standards requiring the NCI to be presented within equity, instead 
of as a mezzanine item between liability and equity. 
Accordingly, our findings in the first paper covered fourteen European countries 
and revealed that the probability of reporting NCI in French-civil-law countries is 
higher and in Common-law countries is lower, when compared to 
Scandinavian/German-civil-law countries, the benchmark group. Besides, we also 
provided empirical evidence that larger firms, leveraged firms and profitable firms are 
more likely to use and report NCI in their consolidated financial statements. In the 
second paper we developed a research covering five from that fourteen European 
countries whose legal origin provides different level of investor protection. We found a 
positive association of NCI with share prices occurring in France and Greece, as 
opposed to a negative association in United Kingdom, as well as Sweden and Germany.  
Afterward, we putted together firms from Common-law and from Scandinavian/German 
civil law countries in order to find whether the market penalization of NCI is 
significantly different between these two groups of firms. Our final results also 
supported that that the NCI in Scandinavian/German civil law countries were negatively 
associated with share prices, although with a less penalization than in the Common law 
country. Finally, in the third paper we provided new empirical evidence suggesting that 
the location of NCI does not matter in terms of market valuation, meaning that the 
market prices the NCI in the same manner irrespectively of being presented within or 
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outside equity. We also perform sensitivity analysis for different sub-sample of firms 
split on characteristics like size, leverage and the weight of NCI in total consolidated 
equity and the previous findings are supported. These last findings covered only 
Germany because, unlike other countries, it has a great representation of early adopter 
firms which provided a reasonable large sample and an ideal natural experiment for 
examining the financial effects of the movement of NCI without suffer the financial 
statement effects of the mandatory adoption of the complete set of IASB standards by 
2005.  
Each one of the research papers that comprises this thesis describes it owns 
conclusions, which can be integrated in the following outline. Firstly, larger firms, more 
leveraged firms and more profitable firms can have incentives to use NCI. However, the 
NCI will be more costly to firms in those countries where they are better protected and 
it is likely that a firm choices to use NCI only when the benefits outweigh the costs, 
justifying our results for the role of country characteristics on the pattern of use of NCI 
in Europe countries. As a matter of fact, our results suggested that the probability of use 
and report NCI is different between countries whose institutional characteristics offer 
different protection to investors, which can be linked to the wealth redistributing effect 
between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. More precisely, it seems that the 
lower the investor protection, the higher the probability of use and report NCI.   
Furthermore, we conclude that legal origin plays a role on the relation between 
NCI and the market value of parent companies. Given that legal origin is linked to the 
level of investor protection, our research provides evidence to conclude that the lower 
the investor protection environment, the more likelihood of a non-negative association 
between NCI and share prices. As institutional environments with stronger protection to 
investors, parent companies are considerate to afford wealth share benefits with NCI but 
they are costly, and the market discounts that value, since literature says that investors 
react harmfully when they have to share financial assets. Thus, in United Kingdom, in 
Sweden and in Germany, the relation between NCI with share prices of parent 
companies is negative, although there is a lower penalization for firms from 
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Scandinavian/German-civil law countries that for our Common law country. These 
conclusions can probably also justify the reason why there are a lower percentage of 
parent companies with subsidiaries partially owned in those three countries when 
compared French-civil law countries. In truth, based on findings for France and Greece, 
we conclude that as the level of protection is weaker, more opportunity to extract 
private benefits of control at expenses of NCI arises and the market values positively 
that ability. In these cases, a plausible reason is that the NCI contribute with additional 
capital that can be useful to parent companies without these suffer from the monitoring 
and other constrains imposed by higher levels of investor protection.  
Finally, we have found no differential or incremental value relevance in NCI 
when they move from outside equity to within equity, providing that the alternative 
ways of reporting of NCI do not matter to market valuation. Moreover, although the 
market perception of NCI could vary according to different firms’ characteristics, our 
findings show that the change in the location where they are reported on the 
consolidated financial statement had no effect in their explanatory power to share 
prices. These findings suggest that investors process all the information and process 
them accordingly, revealing the consistency on pricing NCI and it seems that they are 
not confused with the change in the reporting format.  
Overall, this thesis is one of the first providing empirical evidence on the pattern 
of use of NCI by European countries, on the way as the market values NCI in different 
institutional environments with several controlling-noncontrolling shareholders 
conflicts, and on the consistency of the market pricing NCI before and after changes to 
their location on CSFP under recently IAS/IFRS requirements. Thus, we are convicted 
that our thesis fills a gap on the empirical research comprising the NCI reported on 
financial statements, whose accounting for has recently being strengthened by the 
development of new standards issued by IASB and FASB in their jointly project on 
business combinations. Therefore, our findings may be of use to financial statement 
users, regulators and law and accounting setters. 
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As a final point, we contribute and add prior literature in several ways, 
summarized in the following. Our thesis is helpful for financial statements users 
because we identify the major European players that are affected by the accounting 
standards on matters related to NCI. The way as NCI was and is now reported could 
induce significant errors when comparing financial ratios, either between different firms 
or between different time periods for the same firm (e.g., Mulford and Quinn, 2008; 
Silliman, 2008; Platt, 2008; Whitehouse, 2009; Deitrick, 2010). Analysts need to be 
cautious when analyzing consolidated financial statements, when performing time-
series analyses, and when forecasting future values for key variables. Secondly, we add 
to early studies by combining the literature on value relevance (e.g. Abad et al, 2000; So 
and Smith, 2009; Swanso, 2010) with the literature on legal origin and minority 
shareholder protection as part of the institutional environment where firms develop 
financial and economic activities (e.g  Ali and Hwang, 2000; Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki, 2003; DeFond, Hung and Trezevant, 2007; Hughes, 2009; Rahman, 
Yammeesri and Perera, 2010). We are not aware of other study exploring cross-country 
differences using legal origin to draw conclusions about the way as the market values 
NCI. Finally, our thesis brings new insights in the market perception of NCI. More 
precisely, we contribute to the literature about market consistency on the valuation of 
accounting data presented under different alternative formats, especially when a 
difference on accounting system has occurred  (e.g., Ahmed et al, 2006; Owusu-Ansah 
and Yeoh, 2006; Jifri and Citron, 2009; Mitra and Hossain, 2009). 
 
5.2 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has several limitations that can be viewed as opportunities to future 
research. In first place we do not include all the European countries in the three papers, 
due to the lack of observations, as stated before. Thus, like any serious and rigorous 
research, we have to be caution when draw generalizations. Since we have found that 
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legal origin (and the implied institutional characteristics) can play a role on the way as 
the market views NCI, one possible extension is to develop an analysis but including 
data from all European countries grouped together by legal origin.  Given that, it is 
possible to use a sample technique used by Daske et al (2008) and Landsman et al 
(2011) that retains randomly selected firm-years under which legal origin has the same 
weight by virtue of contributing the same number of observations. Notwithstanding 
slight sensitivity tests (not reported) give robustness to our results.  
A second point is that from fiscal years after July 2009, under new subsidiary´s 
acquisitions, NCI can be measured at fair values (full goodwill method) or can be 
measured at NCI´s proportionate share on the fair value of net assets of that subsidiary. 
We randomly hand collected some reports from 2009 and 2010, and we get evidence 
that just a minor number of firms has chosen the full goodwill method and that fact not 
changed our main results. However, we draw a further opportunity to future research, 
identifying the determinants of the choice to measure NCI by one of the two alternative 
methods, even if that choice will have no impact on share prices. As US GAAP just 
require one method, it is possible to fill the gap on the literature and create a stream of 
research that provides evidence and guidance to the IASB on the convergence with 
FASB on matters concerning the measurement of NCI, which is the only topic for 
which divergence is maintained between these two standards setters. 
A third opportunity to investigate is related to the market assessment of credit 
risk. The Standard & Poor (S&P) Corporate Rate Criteria stated that accounting changes 
should not have any direct impact on credit quality, unless they reveal new information 
about a firm. Nonetheless, they can produce indirect effects due to triggering of 
financial covenants violations or adverse market reactions as a result of changes in the 
market sentiment about the companies apparent leverage. For another point of view, 
current IAS/IFRS and US GAAP requires that all the changes in a parent´s ownership 
interests in a subsidiary that do not result in the parent losing control are accounted as 
equity transactions, and any gains or losses are only recognized in the consolidated 
income or comprehensive income in those cases of partial disposal of an investment in a 
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subsidiary that results in loss of control. Thus, the leverage of a consolidated entity can 
be linked to the transactions with NCI. Moreover, the carrying value of assets and 
liabilities will not be affected by those transactions but, in turns, will be affected by the 
chosen method of measurement of NCI in the initial recognition of a subsidiary. If the 
credit rating assigned by S&P or equivalent can be used as a proxy for the market 
assessment of firms’ credit risk, a further investigation can be developed examining 
whether creditors assign a different rating to firms that have NCI, to firms that 
effectuate equity transactions with NCI (including the loss of control of subsidiaries), 
and to firms who choose to measure NCI at fair value instead of the proportional share 
of net assets. The potential findings will be helpful for accounting, business and 
strategic behavior, and will contribute to fill a gap on the understandable of NCI as 
shareholders of a consolidated equity, whose financial reporting provides useful 
information to investors and creditors in making rational investment and credit 
decisions.  
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